# rr round 3

# 1nc

### 1nc k

**The aff is economic imperialism hidden by benevolence ---this encourages countervailing forces which turn the case.**

**Veltmeyer, ’11** - Professor of Development Studies at the Universidad Autónoma de Zacatecas in Mexico and Professor of Sociology and International Development Studies at St. Mary’s University, (Henry, “US imperialism in Latin America: then and now, here and there,” estudios críticos del desarrollo, vol. I, núm. 1, segundo semestre de 2011, pp. 89–123, http://estudiosdeldesarrollo.net/critical/rev1/3.pdf)//A-Berg

Finding itself in the wake of a second world war as the dominant economic power in the «free world» the US strove assiduously to consolidate this power at the level of foreign policy. Under prevailing conditions that included the potential threat posed by the USSR and the fallout from a spreading and unstoppable decolonization movement in the economically backward areas of the world, United States (US) policymakers decided on, and actively pursued, a foreign policy with three pillars. One of these pillars was a strategy of economic reconstruction of an economically devastated Europe and the capitalist development of the economies and societies on the periphery of the system. A second pillar of the post–war order was what would become known as the «Bretton woods system», composed of three institutions (a Bank of Economic Reconstruction and Development—the World Bank today; the International Monetary fund; and a General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade that would morph into the WTO 50 years on) and the mechanism of the US dollar, based on a fixed gold standard, as the currency of international trade.1 The third pillar was would become the United Nations—a system of international organizations designed to provide the necessary conditions of (capitalist) development and collective security, a system of multilateral conflict resolution. The motivating force behind this foreign policy was clear enough: to advance the geopolitical and economic interests of the US as a world power, including considerations of profit and strategic security (to make the world save for US investments and to reactivate a capital accumulation process). It was to be an empire of free trade and capitalist development, plus democracy where possible, a system of capitalist democracies backed up by a system of international organizations dominated by the US, a military alliance (NATO) focused on Europe in the protection of US interests and collective security, and a more global network of military bases to provide logistical support for its global military apparatus. Within the institutional framework of this system and international order the US was particularly concerned to consolidate its power and influence in Latin America and the Caribbean, regarded by policymakers and many politicians as a legitimate sphere of undue influence—the exercise of state power in the «national interest». This chapter will elaborate on economic and political dynamics of the efforts pursued by the US to pursue these interests via the projection of state power—and the resulting «informal empire» constructed by default. US IMPERIALISM IN LATIN AMERICA—FORMS AND DYNAMICS The US has always been imperialistic in its approach to national development in Latin America, but in the wake of World War II the situation that it found itself in—commanding, it is estimated, half of the world’s industrial capacity and 80% of its financial resources; and already an occupying power of major proportions3—awakened in US policymaking circles and its foreign policy establishment its historic mission regarding the Americas and also the dream of world domination, provoking the quest to bring it about in the preferred form of an «informal empire». A key strategy to this purpose was to institute the rules for what would later be termed «global governance»—for securing its economic and geopolitical strategic intents in a world liberated from colonial rule (id est competing empires). The resulting world order, dubbed Bretton Woods I by some,4 provided an institutional framework for advancing the geopolitical strategic interests of the US in the context of a «cold war» waged against the emerging power of the USSR, and for advancing cooperation for international development, a policy designed to ensure that the economically backward countries seeking to liberate themselves from the yoke of European colonialism would not succumb to the siren of communism, that they would undertake a nation–building and development process on a capitalist path. This development project required the US to assume the lead but also share power with its major allies, strategic partners in a common enterprise organised as the OECD and a united Europe,6 with a system of United Nations institutions to provide a multilateral response to any security threats (and that prevented any one country for embarking on the path of world domination via unilateral action. This was the price that the US had to pay for national security under conditions of an emerging threat presented by the USSR—soviet communism backed up by what was feared to be a growing if not commanding state power. In this context the US began to construct its empire, and it did so on a foundation of six pillars: 1. Consolidation of the liberal capitalist world order, renovating it on neoliberal lines in the early 1980s when conditions allowed; 2. A system of military bases strategically across the world, to provide thereby the staging point and logistics for the projection of military power when needed, and rule by military force when circumstances would dictate; 3. A project of cooperation for international development, to provide financial and technical assistance to countries and regimes willing to sign on the project—to provide a safe haven for US economic interests and pave the way for the expansion of capitalism and democracy, the bulwarks of US imperialism; 4. Implementation of a neoliberal agenda of policy reforms—to adjust the macroeconomic and development policies to the requirements of a new world order in which the forces of freedom would be released from the constraints of the welfare–development state; 5. Regional integration—construction of regional free trade agreements to cooperate with, and not discriminate against, US economic interests regarding international trade; 6. Globalization—the integration of economies across the world into the global economy in a system designed to give maximum freedom to the operating units of the global empire. Each strategy not only served as a pillar of imperial policy but provided the focal point for the projection of state power in different forms as circumstances required or permitted. Together they constituted what might be termed imperialism. Each element of the system was, and is, dynamic in its operations but ultimately unstable because of the countervailing forces that they generated. Within ruling class circles in the US since at least 2000 there is an open acceptance that theirs is an imperial state and that the US should maintain or act to restore its dominant position in the 21st century by any means available, and certainly by force if need be. The whole tenor of the debate in the past two decades over US foreign policy, Mann (2007) notes, is framed in these terms. In this connection, Richard Hass, the current director of Policy Planning in e State Department, wrote an essay in November 2000 advocating that the US adopt an «imperial» feign policy. He defined this as «a foreign policy that attempts to organise the world along certain principles affecting relations between states and conditions within them». This would not be achieved through colonization or colonies but thorough what he termed «informal control» based on a «good neighbour policy» backed up by military force if and when necessary—harking back to the «informal empire» of a previous era (McLean, 1995; Roorda, 1998). Mechanisms such as international financial markets and structural reforms in macroeconomic policy, and agencies such as the World Bank, the WTO and the IMF, would work to ensure the dominance of US interests, with the military iron fist backing up the invisible hand of the market and any failure in multilateral security arrangements. This system of «economic imperialism», maintained by US hegemony as leader of the «free world» (representing the virtues of capitalist democracy), was in place and fully functioning from the 1950s throughout 1980s and the reign of Ronald Reagan. In the 1990s, with the disappearance of the threat of the Soviet Union and international communism, this system of economic imperialism, bed as it was on the hegemony of «democracy and freedom» as well multilateralism in international security arrangements, did not as much break down as it was eclipsed by the emergence of the «new imperialism» based on the unilateral projection of military force as a means of securing world domination in «the American century».7 This conception of a «new imperialism», a «raw imperialism» that would not «hesitate to use [coercive] force if, when and where necessary» (Cooper, 2000), based on «aggressive multilateralism» or the unilateral projection, and strategic use, of state power including emphatic military force, was advanced in neoconservative circles over years of largely internal debate, and put into practice by a succession of regimes, both democratic and republican. It achieved its consummate form in George W. Bush’s White House, in the Gang of Four (Donald Rumsfeld, Paul Wolfowitz, Condoleeza Rice, Dick Cheney),8 and its maximum expression in a policy of imperial war in the Middle east and the Gulf region. Although the US also projected its military power in other theatres of imperial war such Yugoslavia9 and Colombia (viz. the covert Colombia– centered class war «on subversives» against the FARC–EP’ overt regional «war on drugs») the policy of imperial war and the strategy of military force were primarily directed towards the Gulf region (see, inter alia, Petras and Veltmeyer, 2003). In the academic world the issue as to the specific or dominant form taken by imperialism has not been generally framed as a matter of when and under what circumstances military force might be needed or legitimately used (generlly seen as a «last resort» but as the necessary part of the arsenal of force available to the state, conceived of as the only legitimate repository of the use of violence in the «national interest»). Rather, the issue of armed force in the imperialist projection of military power has been framed in terms of an understanding, or the argument. That an imperial order cannot be maintained by force and coercion; it requires «hegemony», which is to say, acquiescence by the subalterns of imperial power achieved by a widespread belief in e legitimacy of that power generated by an overarching myth or dominant ideology—the idea of freedom in the post world war II context of the «cold war» against communism and the idea of globalization in the new imperial order established in the 1980s. Power relations of domination and subordination, even when backed up by coercive or armed force, invariably give rise to resistance, and are only sustainable if and when they are legitimated by an effective ideology—ideas of «democracy» and «freedom» in the case of the American empire or «globalization» in the case of the economic imperialism that came into play in the 1990s.

#### The impact is cultural extinction.

**Escobar 95** - Distinguished Professor of Anthropology, UNC-Chapel Hill (Arturo, “Encountering Development: The Making and Unmaking of the Third World,” pg. 52-54)//BB

The crucial threshold and transformation that took place in the early post– World War II period discussed in this chapter were the result not of a radical epistemological or political breakthrough but of the reorganization of a number of factors that allowed the Third World to display a new visibility and to irrupt into a new realm of language. This new space was carved out of the vast and dense surface of the Third World, placing it in a field of power. Underdevelopment became the subject of political technologies that sought to erase it from the face of the Earth but that ended up, instead, multiplying it to infinity.¶ Development fostered a way of conceiving of social life as a technical problem, as a matter of rational decision and management to be entrusted to that group of people—the development professionals—whose specialized knowledge allegedly qualified them for the task. Instead of seeing change as a process rooted in the interpretation of each society's history and cultural tradition—as a number of intellectuals in various parts of the Third World had attempted to do in the 1920s and 1930s (Gandhi being the best known of them)—these professionals sought to devise mechanisms and procedures to make societies fit a preexisting model that embodied the structures and functions of modernity. Like sorcerers' apprentices, the development professionals awakened once again the dream of reason that, in their hands, as in earlier instances, produced a troubling reality.¶ At times, development grew to be so important for Third World countries that it became acceptable for their rulers to subject their populations to an infinite variety of interventions, to more encompassing forms of power and systems of control; so important that First and Third World elites accepted the price of massive impoverishment, of selling Third World resources to the most convenient bidder, of degrading their physical and human ecologies, of killing and torturing, of condemning their indigenous populations to near extinction; so important that many in the Third World began to think of themselves as inferior, underdeveloped, and ignorant and to doubt the value of their own culture, deciding instead to pledge allegiance to the banners of reason and progress; so important, finally, that the achievement of development clouded the awareness of the impossibility of fulfilling the promises that development seemed to be making.¶ After four decades of this discourse, most forms of understanding and representing the Third World are still dictated by the same basic tenets. The forms of power that have appeared act not so much by repression but by normalization; not by ignorance but by controlled knowledge; not by humanitarian concern but by the bureaucratization of social action. As the conditions that gave rise to development became more pressing, it could only increase its hold, refine its methods, and extend its reach even further. That the materiality of these conditions is not conjured up by an “objective” body of knowledge but is charted out by the rational discourses of economists, politicians, and development experts of all types should already be clear. What has been achieved is a specific configuration of factors and forces in which the new language of development finds support. As a discourse, development is thus a very real historical formation, albeit articulated around an artificial construct (underdevelopment) and upon a certain materiality (the conditions baptized as underdevelopment), which must be conceptualized in different ways if the power of the development discourse is to be challenged or displaced.¶ To be sure, there is a situation of economic exploitation that must be recognized and dealt with. Power is too cynical at the level of exploitation and should be resisted on its own terms. There is also a certain materiality of life conditions that is extremely preoccupying and that requires great effort and attention. But those seeking to understand the Third World through development have long lost sight of this materiality by building upon it a reality that like a castle in the air has haunted us for decades. Understanding the history of the investment of the Third World by Western forms of knowledge and power is a way to shift the ground somewhat so that we can start to look at that materiality with different eyes and in different categories.¶ The coherence of effects that the development discourse achieved is the key to its success as a hegemonic form of representation: the construction of the poor and underdeveloped as universal, preconstituted subjects, based on the privilege of the representers; the exercise of power over the Third World made possible by this discursive homogenization (which entails the erasure of the complexity and diversity of Third World peoples, so that a squatter in Mexico City, a Nepalese peasant, and a Tuareg nomad become equivalent to each other as poor and underdeveloped); and the colonization and domination of the natural and human ecologies and economies of the Third World. [26](http://www.questia.com/reader/action/gotoDocId/103228006)¶ Development assumes a teleology to the extent that it proposes that the “natives” will sooner or later be reformed; at the same time, however, it reproduces endlessly the separation between reformers and those to be reformed by keeping alive the premise of the Third World as different and inferior, as having a limited humanity in relation to the accomplished European. Development relies on this perpetual recognition and disavowal of difference, a feature identified by Bhabha (1990) as inherent to discrimination. The signifiers of “poverty”, “illiteracy,” “hunger,” and so forth have already achieved a fixity as signifieds of “underdevelopment” which seems impossible to sunder. Perhaps no other factor has contributed to cementing the association of “poverty” with “underdevelopment” as the discourse of economists. To them I dedicate the coming chapter.

#### The alternative is to vote negative --- rejecting imperialism in this round serves as a starting point to theorize anti-imperialism and break down hegemonic systems of knowledge.

**Morrissey 11 –** (John, Department of Geography, National University of Ireland, 2011, “Architects of Empire: The Military–Strategic Studies Complex and the Scripting of US National Security,” Antipode Vol. 43, (2):435-470, http://aran.library.nuigalway.ie/xmlui/handle/10379/2893)//a-berg

As an academic working in political geography, a key starting point of resistancefor me is the careful detailing of the largely unseen inner workings of empire in our contemporary world, ultimately in order to be better able to resist it (which is what this paper has been about). That resistance can manifest itself in counter-scriptings in a variety of contexts, from lecture halls to town halls, from academic journals to online blogs. And in a variety of public forums, many geographers have played, and continue to play, important roles in critiquing the war on terror and advancing more nuanced, reasoned and humane geographies and histories of Islam and the Middle East (Gregory 2005). Such academic and public intellectual work can also crucially liaise with, learn from, and be transformed by grassroots activists in peace and social justice movements throughout the world.44 And linking to their work in our teaching especially has more power than perhaps we sometimes realise; especially given the multimedia teaching and learning tools available today.45 A recent Antipodespecial issue saw a number of insightful reflections on the possibilities of “practising public scholarship” [volume 40(3), 2008]. The contributors outline various ways in which critical geographies can support and enable political and social activism. In addition, Don Mitchell makes an important point in reminding us thatacademic “intellectual” and “bureaucratic” work are also “vital parts of any activism” (Mitchell 2008:448). Disrupting and countering the abstracted geopolitical scriptings of strategic studies can take on a variety of forms. But both inside and outside the academy, a key intellectual task, I think, is theorizing anti-imperialism— both historically and in our contemporary moment. Effective counterdiscourses for our time must surely incorporate the lessons learned from the anti-imperial/anti-colonial struggles of history—from Ireland to India, from Algeria to Vietnam. Appellations like “insurgents” do the same discursive work today as the historical preference “rebels” did in reductively demonizing whole populations and delegitimizing their right to resistance. But more importantly, perhaps, they serve too to disengage us from unpacking the discourses and practices of contemporary anti-imperialism. Yet historical contexts of resistancehave much to offer if our endgame is articulating critical and humane geographies of our contemporary world. And this is a crucial challenge, given the sheer pervasiveness of strategic geopolitical discourses that negate human geographical realities. Such scriptings are not only intellectually unconvincing; they are dangerous and hugely consequential. In seeking to avoid dangerously reductive accounts of the world, geography for me has always had a particular responsibility and strength. In understanding conflict, past and present, discourse has perpetually played a troubled role. In reading the current proliferation of “geopolitical discourse”, it is useful to bear in mind history’smultiple reminders of the impossibilities of “colonial discourse” (Morrissey 2010). There is a need to spatialize and locate the material and corporeal geographies of war; not just its imaginative geographies. The spaces and agency of resistance or so-called “insurgency” in the war on terror, for example, are little theorized and frequently not even recognized; reflecting a power relations of knowledge familiar to any student of colonial history. This remains a key challenge for critical accounts of our contemporary geopolitical world. That said, however, connectingwhat James Sidaway calls the “banal geopolitics” of militarism to its brutal consequences will always be an urgent task too (Sidaway 2001, 2008). And the dots can be joined. The military–strategic studies complex in contemporary America is a powerful producer of banal geopolitics, patronized and prioritized geographical knowledge and ultimately actionable geostrategic intelligence. Its experts and advocates are both architects of empire and apologists for its consequences. Their dominant national security discourse is about positing legitimized, aggressive US military action against the threat of irrational terrorism emanating from the Middle East; it is about presenting the USA as the guardian of global economic health; and it is about imperial ambition too. This paper has sought to expose the military–strategic studies complex as playing a central rolein support of that imperial ambition and in the advancement of its aggressive geopolitics. I hope it has signalled too the imperative of resistance. In the face of ubiquitous scriptings of insecurity, war and geopolitics in our contemporary world, the task of both exposing the geoeconomic stakes and insisting on real places with real people, with bodies and rights just like us, is as urgent as ever.

### 1nc cp

#### Text: Congress should delegate the authority to offer to Cuba the option to export Cuban sugarcane ethanol to the United States to the Department of State. The Department of State should pursue and enact the congressional delegation.

#### Solves and net benefit is ptx.

**Epstein et Al., 99** (David Epstein- Department of Political Science and Stanford Graduate School of Business, Columbia and Stanford University, and Sharyn O’Hallaron- Department of Political Science and the School of International and Public Affairs and Hoover Institution, Columbia and Stanford University, January 1999 (“The Nondelegation Doctrine and the Separation of Powers” – Cardozo Law Review) p. lexis

Our institutional analysis begins with the observation that there are two alternative modes for specifying the details of public policy. Policy can be made through the typical legislative process, in which a committee considers a bill and reports it to the floor of the chamber, and then a majority of the floor members must agree on a policy to enact. Alternatively, Congress can pass a law that delegates authority to regulatory agencies, allowing them to fill in some or all of the details of policy. The key is that, given a fixed amount of policy details to be specified, these two modes of poli [\*962] cymaking are substitutes for each other. To the degree that one is used more, the other will perforce be used less. Note also that it is Congress who chooses where policy is made. Legislators can either write detailed, exacting laws, in which case the executive branch will have little or no substantive input into policy, they can delegate the details to agencies, thereby giving the executive branch a substantial role in the policymaking process, or they can pick any point in between. Since legislators' primary goal is reelection, it follows that policy will be made so as to maximize legislators' reelection chances. Thus, delegation will follow the natural fault lines of legislators' political advantage. In making this institutional choice, legislators face costs either way. Making explicit laws requires legislative time and energy that might be profitably spent on more electorally productive activities. After all, one of the reasons bureaucracies are created is for agencies to implement policies in areas where Congress has neither the time nor expertise to micro-manage policy decisions, and by restricting flexibility, Congress would be limiting agencies' ability to adjust to changing circumstances. This tradeoff is captured well by Terry Moe in his discussion of regulatory structure: The most direct way [to control agencies] is for today's authorities to specify, in excruciating detail, precisely what the agency is to do and how it is to do it, leaving as little as possible to the discretionary judgment of bureaucrats - and thus as little as possible for future authorities to exercise control over, short of passing new legislation... Obviously, this is not a formula for creating effective organizations. In the interests of public protection, agencies are knowingly burdened with cumbersome, complicated, technically inappropriate structures that undermine their capacity to perform their jobs well. n40 Where oversight and monitoring problems do not exist, legislators would readily delegate authority to the executive branch, taking advantage of agency expertise, conserving scarce resources of time, staff, and energy, and avoiding the logrolls, delays, and informational inefficiencies associated with the committee system. Consider, for example, the issue of airline safety, which is characterized on the one hand by the need for technical expertise, and on the other hand by an almost complete absence of potential political benefits. That is, policymakers will receive little credit if airlines run well and no disasters occur, but they will have to with [\*963] stand intense scrutiny if something goes wrong. n41 Furthermore, legislative and executive preferences on this issue would tend to be almost perfectly aligned - have fewer accidents as long as the costs to airlines are not prohibitive. The set of individuals receiving benefits, the public who use the airlines, is diffused and ill organized, while those paying the costs of regulation, the airline companies, are well-organized and politically active. Furthermore, keeping in mind that deficiencies in the system are easily detectable, delegated power is relatively simple to monitor. For all these reasons, even if legislators had unlimited time and resources of their own (which they do not), delegation to the executive branch would be the preferred mode of policymaking.

### 1nc t

#### Interpretation – Removing sanctions is a form of appeasement

**Stern, 06** – University of Maryland Graduate (Martin, “Debunking détente”, 11/27/06, http://www.diamondbackonline.com/article\_56223e79-7009-56a3-8afe-5d08bfff6e08.html)//VP

Appeasement is defined as "granting concessions to potential enemies to maintain peace." Giving Iran international legitimacy and removing sanctions would have maintained peace with a potential enemy without changing the undemocratic practices of the enemy. If this isn't appeasement, I don't know how better to define the word.

#### Engagement and appeasement are distinct

Resnick, 01 – Assistant Professor and coordinator of the United States Programme at RSIS (Evan, “Defining Engagement,” Journal of International Affairs, 0022197X, Spring2001, Vol. 54, Issue 2, <http://web.ebscohost.com.turing.library.northwestern.edu/ehost/detail?sid=1b56e6b4-ade2-4052-9114-7d107fdbd019%40sessionmgr12&vid=2&hid=24&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWhvc3QtbGl2ZQ%3d%3d#db=mth&AN=4437301>)//VP

Thus, a rigid conceptual distinction can be drawn between engagement and appeasement. Whereas both policies are positive sanctions--insofar as they add to the power and prestige of the target state--engagement does so in a less direct and less militarized fashion than appeasement. In addition, engagement differs from appeasement by establishing an increasingly interdependent relationship between the sender and the target state. At any juncture, the sender state can, in theory, abrogate such a relationship at some (ideally prohibitive) cost to the target state.(n34) Appeasement, on the other hand, does not involve the establishment of contacts or interdependence between the appeaser and the appeased. Territory and/or a sphere of influence are merely transferred by one party to the other either unconditionally or in exchange for certain concessions on the part of the target state.

#### Violation – they remove restrictions – that’s appeasement

#### That’s a voting issue –

#### 1) Limits – infinite amount of restrictions the aff can remove – explodes neg research burden

#### 2) Ground – Lose spending links based off of increases in funding

### 1nc da - 4

#### Obama is pushing Congress to resolve the debt ceiling --- political capital is key.

Pace 9/12

Julie, AP White House correspondent, Syria debate on hold, Obama refocuses on agenda, The Fresno Bee, 9/12/13, http://www.fresnobee.com/2013/09/12/3493538/obama-seeks-to-focus-on-domestic.html

With a military strike against Syria on hold, President Barack Obama tried Thursday to reignite momentum for his second-term domestic agenda. But his progress could hinge on the strength of his standing on Capitol Hill after what even allies acknowledge were missteps in the latest foreign crisis.¶ "It is still important to recognize that we have a lot of things left to do here in this government," Obama told his Cabinet, starting a sustained White House push to refocus the nation on matters at home as key benchmarks on the budget and health care rapidly approach.¶ "The American people are still interested in making sure that our kids are getting the kind of education they deserve, that we are putting people back to work," Obama said.¶ The White House plans to use next week's five-year anniversary of the 2008 financial collapse to warn Republicans that shutting down the government or failing to raise the debt limit could drag down the still-fragile economy. With Hispanic Heritage Month to begin Monday, Obama is also expected to press for a stalled immigration overhaul and urge minorities to sign up for health care exchanges beginning Oct. 1.¶ Among the events planned for next week is a White House ceremony highlighting Americans working on immigrant and citizenship issues. Administration officials will also promote overhaul efforts at naturalization ceremonies across the country. On Sept. 21, Obama will speak at the Congressional Black Caucus Gala, where he'll trumpet what the administration says are benefits of the president's health care law for African-Americans and other minorities.¶ Two major factors are driving Obama's push to get back on track with domestic issues after three weeks of Syria dominating the political debate. Polls show the economy, jobs and health care remain Americans' top concerns. And Obama has a limited window to make progress on those matters in a second term, when lame-duck status can quickly creep up on presidents, particularly if they start losing public support.¶ Obama already is grappling with some of the lowest approval ratings of his presidency. A Pew Research Center/USA Today poll out this week put his approval at 44 percent. That's down from 55 percent at the end of 2012.¶ Potential military intervention in Syria also is deeply unpopular with many Americans, with a Pew survey finding that 63 percent opposing the idea. And the president's publicly shifting positions on how to respond to a deadly chemical weapons attack in Syria also have confused many Americans and congressional lawmakers.¶ "In times of crisis, the more clarity the better," said Sen. Lindsey Graham, R-S.C., a strong supporter of U.S. intervention in Syria. "This has been confusing. For those who are inclined to support the president, it's been pretty hard to nail down what the purpose of a military strike is."¶ For a time, the Obama administration appeared to be barreling toward an imminent strike in retaliation for the Aug. 21 chemical weapons attack. But Obama made a sudden reversal and instead decided to seek congressional approval for military action.¶ Even after administration officials briefed hundreds of lawmakers on classified intelligence, there appeared to be limited backing for a use-of-force resolution on Capitol Hill. Rather than face defeat, Obama asked lawmakers this week to postpone any votes while the U.S. explores the viability of a deal to secure Syria's chemical weapons stockpiles.¶ That pause comes as a relief to Obama and many Democrats eager to return to issues more in line with the public's concerns. The most pressing matters are a Sept. 30 deadline to approve funding to keep the government open — the new fiscal year begins Oct. 1 — and the start of sign-ups for health care exchanges, a crucial element of the health care overhaul.¶ On Wednesday, a revolt by tea party conservatives forced House Republican leaders to delay a vote on a temporary spending bill written to head off a government shutdown. Several dozen staunch conservatives are seeking to couple the spending bill with a provision to derail implementation of the health care law.¶ The White House also may face a fight with Republicans over raising the nation's debt ceiling this fall. While Obama has insisted he won't negotiate over the debt limit, House Speaker John Boehner on Thursday said the GOP will insist on curbing spending.

#### Plan wrecks PC.

Padgett 10

Tim, Latin America Bureau Chief @ Time Magazine last 14 years, 8/23, <http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,2013820,00.html>

Proponents of doing just that insist there's more consensus than ever in the U.S. to ditch the Cuba embargo and its travel ban, which, after almost 50 years, have utterly failed to dislodge the Castro regime. Opening Cuba to Americans, they believe, will do more to stimulate democratization there than isolating it has. Even a majority of Cuban Americans now agree. Still, for all the good vibes the bill's backers feel from the White House right now, some note warily that Obama has been loath to spend political capital in Cuba, or the rest of Latin America for that matter. Critics, for example, point to his decision last year to stop applying pressure against coup leaders in Honduras, who'd ousted a leftist President, when conservative Republicans in Congress objected. Embargo supporters, including Cuban-American Senator Robert Menendez of New Jersey, a Democrat, are already blasting Obama's plans to relax Cuba travel. "This is not the time to ease the pressure on the Castro regime," Menendez said this month, insisting it will only give the brothers "a much needed infusion of dollars that will only extend their reign of oppression." As a result, says one congressional aide who asked not to be identified, when it comes time for the White House to give the bill more full-throated support, "there's a fear they may just decide that the fight's not worth it."

#### Collapses the global economy.

Davidson 13

Adam, co-founder of NPR’s “Planet Money,” Our Debt to Society, New York Times, 9/10/13, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/15/magazine/our-debt-to-society.html?pagewanted=all

If the debt ceiling isn’t lifted again this fall, some serious financial decisions will have to be made. Perhaps the government can skimp on its foreign aid or furlough all of NASA, but eventually the big-ticket items, like Social Security and Medicare, will have to be cut. At some point, the government won’t be able to pay interest on its bonds and will enter what’s known as sovereign default, the ultimate national financial disaster achieved by countries like Zimbabwe, Ecuador and Argentina (and now Greece). In the case of the United States, though, it won’t be an isolated national crisis. If the American government can’t stand behind the dollar, the world’s benchmark currency, then the global financial system will very likely enter a new era in which there is much less trade and much less economic growth. It would be, by most accounts, the largest self-imposed financial disaster in history.¶ Nearly everyone involved predicts that someone will blink before this disaster occurs. Yet a small number of House Republicans (one political analyst told me it’s no more than 20) appear willing to see what happens if the debt ceiling isn’t raised — at least for a bit. This could be used as leverage to force Democrats to drastically cut government spending and eliminate President Obama’s signature health-care-reform plan. In fact, Representative Tom Price, a Georgia Republican, told me that the whole problem could be avoided if the president agreed to drastically cut spending and lower taxes. Still, it is hard to put this act of game theory into historic context. Plenty of countries — and some cities, like Detroit — have defaulted on their financial obligations, but only because their governments ran out of money to pay their bills. No wealthy country has ever voluntarily decided — in the middle of an economic recovery, no less — to default. And there’s certainly no record of that happening to the country that controls the global reserve currency.¶ Like many, I assumed a self-imposed U.S. debt crisis might unfold like most involuntary ones. If the debt ceiling isn’t raised by X-Day, I figured, the world’s investors would begin to see America as an unstable investment and rush to sell their Treasury bonds. The U.S. government, desperate to hold on to investment, would then raise interest rates far higher, hurtling up rates on credit cards, student loans, mortgages and corporate borrowing — which would effectively put a clamp on all trade and spending. The U.S. economy would collapse far worse than anything we’ve seen in the past several years.¶ Instead, Robert Auwaerter, head of bond investing for Vanguard, the world’s largest mutual-fund company, told me that the collapse might be more insidious. “You know what happens when the market gets upset?” he said. “There’s a flight to quality. Investors buy Treasury bonds. It’s a bit perverse.” In other words, if the U.S. comes within shouting distance of a default (which Auwaerter is confident won’t happen), the world’s investors — absent a safer alternative, given the recent fates of the euro and the yen — might actually buy even more Treasury bonds. Indeed, interest rates would fall and the bond markets would soar.¶ While this possibility might not sound so bad, it’s really far more damaging than the apocalyptic one I imagined. Rather than resulting in a sudden crisis, failure to raise the debt ceiling would lead to a slow bleed. Scott Mather, head of the global portfolio at Pimco, the world’s largest private bond fund, explained that while governments and institutions might go on a U.S.-bond buying frenzy in the wake of a debt-ceiling panic, they would eventually recognize that the U.S. government was not going through an odd, temporary bit of insanity. They would eventually conclude that it had become permanently less reliable. Mather imagines institutional investors and governments turning to a basket of currencies, putting their savings in a mix of U.S., European, Canadian, Australian and Japanese bonds. Over the course of decades, the U.S. would lose its unique role in the global economy.¶ The U.S. benefits enormously from its status as global reserve currency and safe haven. Our interest and mortgage rates are lower; companies are able to borrow money to finance their new products more cheaply. As a result, there is much more economic activity and more wealth in America than there would be otherwise. If that status erodes, the U.S. economy’s peaks will be lower and recessions deeper; future generations will have fewer job opportunities and suffer more when the economy falters. And, Mather points out, no other country would benefit from America’s diminished status. When you make the base risk-free asset more risky, the entire global economy becomes riskier and costlier.

#### Nuclear war

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Aaron, Prof. Politics. And IR @ Princeton’s Woodrow Wilson School and Visiting Scholar @ Witherspoon Institute, and Gabriel, Senior Editor of Commentary and Wall Street Journal, “The Dangers of a Diminished America” <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122455074012352571.html>

Then there are the dolorous consequences of a potential collapse of the world's financial architecture. For decades now, Americans have enjoyed the advantages of being at the center of that system. The worldwide use of the dollar, and the stability of our economy, among other things, made it easier for us to run huge budget deficits, as we counted on foreigners to pick up the tab by buying dollar-denominated assets as a safe haven. Will this be possible in the future? Meanwhile, traditional foreign-policy challenges are multiplying. The threat from al Qaeda and Islamic terrorist affiliates has not been extinguished. Iran and North Korea are continuing on their bellicose paths, while Pakistan and Afghanistan are progressing smartly down the road to chaos. Russia's new militancy and China's seemingly relentless rise also give cause for concern. If America now tries to pull back from the world stage, it will leave a dangerous power vacuum. The stabilizing effects of our presence in Asia, our continuing commitment to Europe, and our position as defender of last resort for Middle East energy sources and supply lines could all be placed at risk. In such a scenario there are shades of the 1930s, when global trade and finance ground nearly to a halt, the peaceful democracies failed to cooperate, and aggressive powers led by the remorseless fanatics who rose up on the crest of economic disaster exploited their divisions. Today we run the risk that rogue states may choose to become ever more reckless with their nuclear toys, just at our moment of maximum vulnerability. The aftershocks of the financial crisis will almost certainly rock our principal strategic competitors even harder than they will rock us. The dramatic free fall of the Russian stock market has demonstrated the fragility of a state whose economic performance hinges on high oil prices, now driven down by the global slowdown. China is perhaps even more fragile, its economic growth depending heavily on foreign investment and access to foreign markets. Both will now be constricted, inflicting economic pain and perhaps even sparking unrest in a country where political legitimacy rests on progress in the long march to prosperity. None of this is good news if the authoritarian leaders of these countries seek to divert attention from internal travails with external adventures.

## case

### Cuba

#### No impact to hotspots.

**Walt 11** – professor international affairs at Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy School of Government. Dude, it’s Stephen Walt (Stephen M., “Rethinking Retrenchment: Can the United States do Less and Do Better?”, 7/8/11, Foreign Policy, <http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/07/08/rethinking_retrenchment>)//Beddow

If you're intrigued by these larger questions, you should definitely read Paul MacDonald and Joseph Parent's "Graceful Decline: The Surprising Success of Great Power Retrenchment," from the Spring 2011 issue of International Security. Based on a comprehensive survey of 18 cases of great power decline (defined as situations where a great power's ordinal ranking of share of economic power changes for the worse), MacDonald and Parent show that declining powers are usually able to adjust their strategic commitments without significant harmful consequences. Money quotation: Faced with diminishing resources, great powers moderate their foreign policy ambitions and offer concessions in areas of lesser strategic value. Contrary to the pessimistic conclusions of critics, retrenchment neither requires aggression nor invites predation. Great powers are able to rebalance their commitments through compromise, rather than conflict. In these ways, states respond to penury the same way they do to plenty: they seek to adopt policies that maximize security given available means. Far from being a hazardous policy, retrenchment can be successful. States that retrench often regain their position in the hierarchy of great powers. Of the fifteen great powers that adopted retrenchment in response to acute relative decline, 40 percent managed to recover their ordinal rank. In contrast, none of the declining powers that failed to retrench recovered their relative position. If McDonald and Parent are right, it suggests that Obama & Co. erred when they decided to double down in Central Asia. After the debacle in Iraq and the 2007 financial crisis, the United States needed to take bold action to bring its global commitments in line with its resources. Obama wisely kept us on course out of Iraq (though not that quickly), but an ambitious new team of foreign policy wonks wanted their turn at running the world and did relatively little to put U.S. grand strategy on a more sustainable footing. Woodward's account of the debate on Afghanistan suggests that Obama and a few of his advisors understood the need to retrench in a general way (and Obama has repeatedly talked about the greater importance of "nation-building" at home) but they were unable or unwilling to make the hard choices necessary to pull of this adjustment or to impose that consensus on the entire national security establishment. Retrenchment is going to happen eventually, I'm sure, just not nearly as fast as it should have.

#### No risk of nuclear terror – assumes every warrant

**Mueller 10** (John, professor of political science at Ohio State, Calming Our Nuclear Jitters, Issues in Science and Technology, Winter, http://www.issues.org/26.2/mueller.html)

Politicians of all stripes preach to an anxious, appreciative, and very numerous choir when they, like President Obama, proclaim atomic terrorism to be “the most immediate and extreme threat to global security.” It is the problem that, according to Defense Secretary Robert Gates, currently keeps every senior leader awake at night. This is hardly a new anxiety. In 1946, atomic bomb maker J. Robert Oppenheimer ominously warned that if three or four men could smuggle in units for an atomic bomb, they could blow up New York. This was an early expression of a pattern of dramatic risk inflation that has persisted throughout the nuclear age. In fact, although expanding fires and fallout might increase the effective destructive radius, the blast of a Hiroshima-size device would “blow up” about 1% of the city’s area—a tragedy, of course, but not the same as one 100 times greater. In the early 1970s, nuclear physicist Theodore Taylor proclaimed the atomic terrorist problem to be “immediate,” explaining at length “how comparatively easy it would be to steal nuclear material and step by step make it into a bomb.” At the time he thought it was already too late to “prevent the making of a few bombs, here and there, now and then,” or “in another ten or fifteen years, it will be too late.” Three decades after Taylor, we continue to wait for terrorists to carry out their “easy” task. In contrast to these predictions, terrorist groups seem to have exhibited only limited desire and even less progress in going atomic. This may be because, after brief exploration of the possible routes, they, unlike generations of alarmists, have discovered that the tremendous effort required is scarcely likely to be successful. The most plausible route for terrorists, according to most experts, would be to manufacture an atomic device themselves from purloined fissile material (plutonium or, more likely, highly enriched uranium). This task, however, remains a daunting one, requiring that a considerable series of difficult hurdles be conquered and in sequence. Outright armed theft of fissile material is exceedingly unlikely not only because of the resistance of guards, but because chase would be immediate. A more promising approach would be to corrupt insiders to smuggle out the required substances. However, this requires the terrorists to pay off a host of greedy confederates, including brokers and money-transmitters, any one of whom could turn on them or, either out of guile or incompetence, furnish them with stuff that is useless. Insiders might also consider the possibility that once the heist was accomplished, the terrorists would, as analyst Brian Jenkins none too delicately puts it, “have every incentive to cover their trail, beginning with eliminating their confederates.” If terrorists were somehow successful at obtaining a sufficient mass of relevant material, they would then probably have to transport it a long distance over unfamiliar terrain and probably while being pursued by security forces. Crossing international borders would be facilitated by following established smuggling routes, but these are not as chaotic as they appear and are often under the watch of suspicious and careful criminal regulators. If border personnel became suspicious of the commodity being smuggled, some of them might find it in their interest to disrupt passage, perhaps to collect the bounteous reward money that would probably be offered by alarmed governments once the uranium theft had been discovered. Once outside the country with their precious booty, terrorists would need to set up a large and well-equipped machine shop to manufacture a bomb and then to populate it with a very select team of highly skilled scientists, technicians, machinists, and administrators. The group would have to be assembled and retained for the monumental task while no consequential suspicions were generated among friends, family, and police about their curious and sudden absence from normal pursuits back home. Members of the bomb-building team would also have to be utterly devoted to the cause, of course, and they would have to be willing to put their lives and certainly their careers at high risk, because after their bomb was discovered or exploded they would probably become the targets of an intense worldwide dragnet operation. Some observers have insisted that it would be easy for terrorists to assemble a crude bomb if they could get enough fissile material. But Christoph Wirz and Emmanuel Egger, two senior physicists in charge of nuclear issues at Switzerland‘s Spiez Laboratory, bluntly conclude that the task “could hardly be accomplished by a subnational group.” They point out that precise blueprints are required, not just sketches and general ideas, and that even with a good blueprint the terrorist group would most certainly be forced to redesign. They also stress that the work is difficult, dangerous, and extremely exacting, and that the technical requirements in several fields verge on the unfeasible. Stephen Younger, former director of nuclear weapons research at Los Alamos Laboratories, has made a similar argument, pointing out that uranium is “exceptionally difficult to machine” whereas “plutonium is one of the most complex metals ever discovered, a material whose basic properties are sensitive to exactly how it is processed.“ Stressing the “daunting problems associated with material purity, machining, and a host of other issues,” Younger concludes, “to think that a terrorist group, working in isolation with an unreliable supply of electricity and little access to tools and supplies” could fabricate a bomb “is farfetched at best.” Under the best circumstances, the process of making a bomb could take months or even a year or more, which would, of course, have to be carried out in utter secrecy. In addition, people in the area, including criminals, may observe with increasing curiosity and puzzlement the constant coming and going of technicians unlikely to be locals. If the effort to build a bomb was successful, the finished product, weighing a ton or more, would then have to be transported to and smuggled into the relevant target country where it would have to be received by collaborators who are at once totally dedicated and technically proficient at handling, maintaining, detonating, and perhaps assembling the weapon after it arrives. The financial costs of this extensive and extended operation could easily become monumental. There would be expensive equipment to buy, smuggle, and set up and people to pay or pay off. Some operatives might work for free out of utter dedication to the cause, but the vast conspiracy also requires the subversion of a considerable array of criminals and opportunists, each of whom has every incentive to push the price for cooperation as high as possible. Any criminals competent and capable enough to be effective allies are also likely to be both smart enough to see boundless opportunities for extortion and psychologically equipped by their profession to be willing to exploit them. Those who warn about the likelihood of a terrorist bomb contend that a terrorist group could, if with great difficulty, overcome each obstacle and that doing so in each case is “not impossible.” But although it may not be impossible to surmount each individual step, the likelihood that a group could surmount a series of them quickly becomes vanishingly small. Table 1 attempts to catalogue the barriers that must be overcome under the scenario considered most likely to be successful. In contemplating the task before them, would-be atomic terrorists would effectively be required to go though an exercise that looks much like this. If and when they do, they will undoubtedly conclude that their prospects are daunting and accordingly uninspiring or even terminally dispiriting. It is possible to calculate the chances for success. Adopting probability estimates that purposely and heavily bias the case in the terrorists’ favor—for example, assuming the terrorists have a 50% chance of overcoming each of the 20 obstacles—the chances that a concerted effort would be successful comes out to be less than one in a million. If one assumes, somewhat more realistically, that their chances at each barrier are one in three, the cumulative odds that they will be able to pull off the deed drop to one in well over three billion. Other routes would-be terrorists might take to acquire a bomb are even more problematic. They are unlikely to be given or sold a bomb by a generous like-minded nuclear state for delivery abroad because the risk would be high, even for a country led by extremists, that the bomb (and its source) would be discovered even before delivery or that it would be exploded in a manner and on a target the donor would not approve, including on the donor itself. Another concern would be that the terrorist group might be infiltrated by foreign intelligence. The terrorist group might also seek to steal or illicitly purchase a “loose nuke“ somewhere. However, it seems probable that none exist. All governments have an intense interest in controlling any weapons on their territory because of fears that they might become the primary target. Moreover, as technology has developed, finished bombs have been out-fitted with devices that trigger a non-nuclear explosion that destroys the bomb if it is tampered with. And there are other security techniques: Bombs can be kept disassembled with the component parts stored in separate high-security vaults, and a process can be set up in which two people and multiple codes are required not only to use the bomb but to store, maintain, and deploy it. As Younger points out, “only a few people in the world have the knowledge to cause an unauthorized detonation of a nuclear weapon.” There could be dangers in the chaos that would emerge if a nuclear state were to utterly collapse; Pakistan is frequently cited in this context and sometimes North Korea as well. However, even under such conditions, nuclear weapons would probably remain under heavy guard by people who know that a purloined bomb might be used in their own territory. They would still have locks and, in the case of Pakistan, the weapons would be disassembled. The al Qaeda factor The degree to which al Qaeda, the only terrorist group that seems to want to target the United States, has pursued or even has much interest in a nuclear weapon may have been exaggerated. The 9/11 Commission stated that “al Qaeda has tried to acquire or make nuclear weapons for at least ten years,” but the only substantial evidence it supplies comes from an episode that is supposed to have taken place about 1993 in Sudan, when al Qaeda members may have sought to purchase some uranium that turned out to be bogus. Information about this supposed venture apparently comes entirely from Jamal al Fadl, who defected from al Qaeda in 1996 after being caught stealing $110,000 from the organization. Others, including the man who allegedly purchased the uranium, assert that although there were various other scams taking place at the time that may have served as grist for Fadl, the uranium episode never happened. As a key indication of al Qaeda’s desire to obtain atomic weapons, many have focused on a set of conversations in Afghanistan in August 2001 that two Pakistani nuclear scientists reportedly had with Osama bin Laden and three other al Qaeda officials. Pakistani intelligence officers characterize the discussions as “academic” in nature. It seems that the discussion was wide-ranging and rudimentary and that the scientists provided no material or specific plans. Moreover, the scientists probably were incapable of providing truly helpful information because their expertise was not in bomb design but in the processing of fissile material, which is almost certainly beyond the capacities of a nonstate group. Kalid Sheikh Mohammed, the apparent planner of the 9/11 attacks, reportedly says that al Qaeda’s bomb efforts never went beyond searching the Internet. After the fall of the Taliban in 2001, technical experts from the CIA and the Department of Energy examined documents and other information that were uncovered by intelligence agencies and the media in Afghanistan. They uncovered no credible information that al Qaeda had obtained fissile material or acquired a nuclear weapon. Moreover, they found no evidence of any radioactive material suitable for weapons. They did uncover, however, a “nuclear-related” document discussing “openly available concepts about the nuclear fuel cycle and some weapons-related issues.” Just a day or two before al Qaeda was to flee from Afghanistan in 2001, bin Laden supposedly told a Pakistani journalist, “If the United States uses chemical or nuclear weapons against us, we might respond with chemical and nuclear weapons. We possess these weapons as a deterrent.” Given the military pressure that they were then under and taking into account the evidence of the primitive or more probably nonexistent nature of al Qaeda’s nuclear program, the reported assertions, although unsettling, appear at best to be a desperate bluff. Bin Laden has made statements about nuclear weapons a few other times. Some of these pronouncements can be seen to be threatening, but they are rather coy and indirect, indicating perhaps something of an interest, but not acknowledging a capability. And as terrorism specialist Louise Richardson observes, “Statements claiming a right to possess nuclear weapons have been misinterpreted as expressing a determination to use them. This in turn has fed the exaggeration of the threat we face.” Norwegian researcher Anne Stenersen concluded after an exhaustive study of available materials that, although “it is likely that al Qaeda central has considered the option of using non-conventional weapons,” there is “little evidence that such ideas ever developed into actual plans, or that they were given any kind of priority at the expense of more traditional types of terrorist attacks.” She also notes that information on an al Qaeda computer left behind in Afghanistan in 2001 indicates that only $2,000 to $4,000 was earmarked for weapons of mass destruction research and that the money was mainly for very crude work on chemical weapons. Today, the key portions of al Qaeda central may well total only a few hundred people, apparently assisting the Taliban’s distinctly separate, far larger, and very troublesome insurgency in Afghanistan. Beyond this tiny band, there are thousands of sympathizers and would-be jihadists spread around the globe. They mainly connect in Internet chat rooms, engage in radicalizing conversations, and variously dare each other to actually do something. Any “threat,” particularly to the West, appears, then, principally to derive from self-selected people, often isolated from each other, who fantasize about performing dire deeds. From time to time some of these people, or ones closer to al Qaeda central, actually manage to do some harm. And occasionally, they may even be able to pull off something large, such as 9/11. But in most cases, their capacities and schemes, or alleged schemes, seem to be far less dangerous than initial press reports vividly, even hysterically, suggest. Most important for present purposes, however, is that any notion that al Qaeda has the capacity to acquire nuclear weapons, even if it wanted to, looks farfetched in the extreme. It is also noteworthy that, although there have been plenty of terrorist attacks in the world since 2001, all have relied on conventional destructive methods. For the most part, terrorists seem to be heeding the advice found in a memo on an al Qaeda laptop seized in Pakistan in 2004: “Make use of that which is available … rather than waste valuable time becoming despondent over that which is not within your reach.” In fact, history consistently demonstrates that terrorists prefer weapons that they know and understand, not new, exotic ones. Glenn Carle, a 23-year CIA veteran and once its deputy intelligence officer for transnational threats, warns, “We must not take fright at the specter our leaders have exaggerated. In fact, we must see jihadists for the small, lethal, disjointed, and miserable opponents that they are.” al Qaeda, he says, has only a handful of individuals capable of planning, organizing, and leading a terrorist organization, and although the group has threatened attacks with nuclear weapons, “its capabilities are far inferior to its desires.” Policy alternatives The purpose here has not been to argue that policies designed to inconvenience the atomic terrorist are necessarily unneeded or unwise. Rather, in contrast with the many who insist that atomic terrorism under current conditions is rather likely— indeed, exceedingly likely—to come about, I have contended that it is hugely unlikely. However, it is important to consider not only the likelihood that an event will take place, but also its consequences. Therefore, one must be concerned about catastrophic events even if their probability is small, and efforts to reduce that likelihood even further may well be justified. At some point, however, probabilities become so low that, even for catastrophic events, it may make sense to ignore them or at least put them on the back burner; in short, the risk becomes acceptable. For example, the British could at any time attack the United States with their submarine-launched missiles and kill millions of Americans, far more than even the most monumentally gifted and lucky terrorist group. Yet the risk that this potential calamity might take place evokes little concern; essentially it is an acceptable risk. Meanwhile, Russia, with whom the United States has a rather strained relationship, could at any time do vastly more damage with its nuclear weapons, a fully imaginable calamity that is substantially ignored. In constructing what he calls “a case for fear,” Cass Sunstein, a scholar and current Obama administration official, has pointed out that if there is a yearly probability of 1 in 100,000 that terrorists could launch a nuclear or massive biological attack, the risk would cumulate to 1 in 10,000 over 10 years and to 1 in 5,000 over 20. These odds, he suggests, are “not the most comforting.” Comfort, of course, lies in the viscera of those to be comforted, and, as he suggests, many would probably have difficulty settling down with odds like that. But there must be some point at which the concerns even of these people would ease. Just perhaps it is at one of the levels suggested above: one in a million or one in three billion per attempt.

#### Gorrel cites NoKo, China And iran

#### No iran impact

Aghsan and Jakobsen 10

Ali Rahigh-Aghsan is Assistant Professor at the Department of Society and Globalisation, Roskilde University and Peter Viggo Jakobsen is Associate Professor at the Department of Political Science, University of Copenhagen. “The Rise of Iran: How Durable, How Dangerous?”. The Middle East Journal, Volume 64, Number 4, Autumn 2010, pp. 559-573. Project Muse.

The rise in Iranian power is unsustainable and less threatening than the hard and soft power arguments suggest. The rise of Iran has largely been caused by factors that Tehran does not control: unsuccessful US policies, high oil prices, and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Tehran has jumped through a window created by others and exploited very favorable external circumstances to position itself as a spoiler in the regional conflicts in the Middle East. The hard and soft power camps are correct in pointing out that Iran can throw a spanner in the works in Afghanistan, Lebanon, Iraq, and Palestine and needs to be given a seat at the table when these issues are being discussed. They are wrong in believing that Iran commands the hard and soft power to determine the outcomes in any of these conflicts singlehandedly. Its declining influence in Iraq is a clear indication of this. Its current ability to shape and determine future outcomes in the Persian Gulf and the Middle East will be reduced by growing political and economic difficulties that will make it increasingly difficult for Tehran to pursue a coherent and proactive foreign and security policy. It will be reduced further by the balancing efforts that Tehran’s active support for Hamas and Hizbullah and its nuclear program have triggered to date; efforts that are bound to increase significantly if Iran does decide to build a nuclear weapon.

#### No Korean war---laundry list---(rational regime, empirics, military inferiority, and it’s all just domestic propaganda)

Fisher ‘13 Max, Foreign Policy Writer @ Washington Post & Former Editor at the Atlantic, “Why North Korea loves to threaten World War III (but probably won’t follow through)” http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2013/03/12/why-north-korea-loves-to-threaten-world-war-iii-but-probably-wont-follow-through/

North Korea is indeed a dangerous rogue state that has, in the recent past, staged small-scale but deadly attacks on South Korea without provocation. In March 2010, a South Korean navy ship was attacked by a ship of unknown origin, killing 46 on board; though North Korea denied responsibility, an investigation concluded it was likely responsible. A few months later, North Korea fired over 100 artillery shells at Yeonpyeong Island, killing two civilians and wounding 19.

But is North Korea really an irrational nation on the brink of launching “all-out war,” a mad dog of East Asia? Is Pyongyang ready to sacrifice it all? Probably not. The North Korean regime, for all its cruelty, has also shown itself to be **shrewd, calculating, and single-mindedly obsessed with its own self-preservation**. The regime’s past behavior **suggests pretty strongly** that these **threats are empty**. But they still matter.

**For years**, North Korea has threatened the worst and, despite all of its apparent readiness, never gone through with it. So why does it keep going through these macabre performances? We can’t read Kim Jong Eun’s mind, but the most plausible explanation has to do with internal North Korean politics, with trying to set the tone for regional politics, and with forcing other countries (including the United States) to bear the costs of preventing its outbursts from sparking an unwanted war.

Starting World War III or a second Korean War would not serve any of Pyongyang’s interests. Whether or not it deploys its small but legitimately scary nuclear arsenal, North Korea could indeed cause substantial mayhem in the South, whose capital is mere miles from the border. But the North Korean military is antiquated and inferior; it wouldn’t last long against a U.S.-led counterattack. No matter how badly such a war would go for South Korea or the United States, it would almost **certainly end with the regime’s total destruction**.

Still, provocations and threats do serve Pyongyang’s interests, even if no one takes those threats very seriously. It helps to rally North Koreans, particularly the all-important military, behind the leader who has done so much to impoverish them. It also helps Pyongyang to control the regional politics that should otherwise be so hostile to its interests. Howard French, a former New York Times bureau chief for Northeast Asia whom I had the pleasure of editing at The Atlantic, explained on Kim Jong Il’s death that Kim had made up for North Korea’s weakness with canny belligerence:

The shtick of apparent madness flowed from his country’s fundamental weakness as he, like a master poker player, resolved to bluff and bluff big. Kim adopted a game of brinkmanship with the South, threatening repeatedly to turn Seoul into a “sea of flames.” And while this may have sharply raised the threat of war, for the North, it steadily won concessions: fuel oil deliveries, food aid, nuclear reactor construction, hard cash-earning tourist enclaves and investment zones.

At the risk of insulting Kim Jong Eun, it helps to think of North Korea’s provocations as somewhat akin to a child throwing a temper tantrum. He might do lots of shouting, make some over-the-top declarations (“I hate my sister,” “I’m never going back to school again”) and even throw a punch or two. Still, you give the child the attention he craves and maybe even a toy, **not because you think the threats are real** or because he deserves it, but because you want the tantrum to stop.

#### No US-China war --- cooperation

**Rosecrance et al 10** (Richard, Political Science Professor @ Cal and Senior Fellow @ Harvard’s Belfer Center and Former Director @ Burkle Center of IR @ UCLA, and Jia Qingguo, PhD Cornell, Professor and Associate Dean of School of International Studies @ Peking University, “Delicately Poised: Are China and the US Heading for Conflict?” Global Asia 4.4, <http://www.globalasia.org/l.php?c=e251>)

Will China and the US Go to War? If one accepts the previous analysis, the answer is “no,” or at least not likely. Why? First, despite its revolutionary past, China has gradually accepted the US-led world order and become a status quo power. It has joined most of the important inter-governmental international organizations. It has subscribed to most of the important international laws and regimes. It has not only accepted the current world order, it has become a strong supporter and defender of it. China has repeatedly argued that the authority of the United Nations and international law should be respected in the handling of international security crises. China has become an ardent advocate of multilateralism in managing international problems. And China has repeatedly defended the principle of free trade in the global effort to fight the current economic crisis, despite efforts by some countries, including the US, to resort to protectionism. To be sure, there are some aspects of the US world order that China does not like and wants to reform. However, it wishes to improve that world order rather than to destroy it. Second, China has clearly rejected the option of territorial expansion. It argues that territorial expansion is both immoral and counterproductive: immoral because it is imperialistic and counterproductive because it does not advance one’s interests. China’s behavior shows that instead of trying to expand its territories, it has been trying to settle its border disputes through negotiation. Through persistent efforts, China has concluded quite a number of border agreements in recent years. As a result, most of its land borders are now clearly drawn and marked under agreements with its neighbors. In addition, China is engaging in negotiations to resolve its remaining border disputes and making arrangements for peaceful settlement of disputed islands and territorial waters. Finally, even on the question of Taiwan, which China believes is an indisputable part of its territory, it has adopted a policy of peaceful reunification. A country that handles territorial issues in such a manner is by no means expansionist. Third, China has relied on trade and investment for national welfare and prestige, instead of military conquest. And like the US, Japan and Germany, China has been very successful in this regard. In fact, so successful that it really sees no other option than to continue on this path to prosperity. Finally, after years of reforms, China increasingly finds itself sharing certain basic values with the US, such as a commitment to the free market, rule of law, human rights and democracy. Of course, there are still significant differences in terms of how China understands and practices these values. However, at a conceptual level, Beijing agrees that these are good values that it should strive to realize in practice. A Different World It is also important to note that certain changes in international relations since the end of World War II have made the peaceful rise of a great power more likely. To begin with, the emergence of nuclear weapons has drastically reduced the usefulness of war as a way to settle great power rivalry. By now, all great powers either have nuclear weapons or are under a nuclear umbrella. If the objective of great power rivalry is to enhance one’s interests or prestige, the sheer destructiveness of nuclear weapons means that these goals can no longer be achieved through military confrontation. Under these circumstances, countries have to find other ways to accommodate each other — something that China and the US have been doing and are likely to continue to do. Also, globalization has made it easier for great powers to increase their national welfare and prestige through international trade and investment rather than territorial expansion. In conducting its foreign relations, the US relied more on trade and investment than territorial expansion during its rise, while Japan and Germany relied almost exclusively on international trade and investment. China, too, has found that its interests are best served by adopting the same approach. Finally, the development of relative pacifism in the industrialized world, and indeed throughout the world since World War II, has discouraged any country from engaging in territorial expansion. There is less and less popular support for using force to address even legitimate concerns on the part of nation states. Against this background, efforts to engage in territorial expansion are likely to rally international resistance and condemnation. Given all this, is the rise of China likely to lead to territorial expansion and war with the US? The answer is no.

### Sugarcane

#### Scarcity doesn’t cause war

**Deudney 99** (Daniel, Asst Prof of Poli Sci at Johns Hopkins, Contested Grounds: Security and Conflict in the New Environmental Politics )

Another major limitation of most studies on environmental conflict is that they rarely consider the character of the overall international system in assessing the prospects for conflict and violence. Of course, it is impossible to analyze everything at once, but conclusions about conflictual outcomes are premature until the main features of the world political system are factored in. The frequency with which environmental scarcity and conflict will produce violent conflict, particularly interstate wars, is profoundly shaped by six features of contemporary world politics: (1) the prevalance of capitalism and the extent of international trade; (2) the existence of numerous functional international organizations, nongovernmental organizations and epistemic communities; (3) highly developed state-system institutions; and (4) the existence of nuclear weapons; (5) the widespread diffusion of conventional weaponry; and (6) the influence of a hegemonic coalition of liberal constitutional democracies. These deeply rooted material and institutional features of the contemporary world order greatly reduce the likelihood that environmental scarcities and change will lead to interstate violence (see figure 8.1).

#### Subsidies for corn means the aff takes forever

#### It’s natural

**Carter et. Al 12–** Robert, PhD, Adjuct Research Fellow, James Cook University, Craig Idso, PhD, Chairman at the Center for the Study of Carbon Dioxide and Global Change, Fred Singer, PhD, President of the Science and Environmental Policy Project, Susan Crockford, evolutionary biologist with a specialty in skeletal taxonomy , paleozoology and vertebrate evolution, Joseph D’Aleo, 30 years of experience in professional meteorology, former college professor of Meteorology at Lyndon State College, Indur Goklany, independent scholar, author, and co-editor of the Electronic Journal of Sustainable Development, Sherwood Idso, President of the Center for the Study of Carbon Dioxide and Global Change, Research Physicist with the US Department of Agriculture, Adjunct Professor in the Departments of Geology, Botany, and Microbiology at Arizona State University, Bachelor of Physics, Master of Science, and Doctor of Philosophy, all from the University of Minnesota, Madhav Khandekar, former research scientist from Environment Canada and is an expert reviewer for the IPCC 2007 Climate Change Panel, Anthony Lupo, Department Chair and Professor of Atmospheric Science at the University of Missouri, Willie Soon, astrophysicist at the Solar and Stellar Physics Division of the Harvard-Smithsonian Center for Astrophysics, Mitch Taylor (Canada) (February 2012, “Eight Centuries of Climate Change in Northeast Spain” <http://www.nipccreport.org/articles/2012/feb/8feb2012a3.html>

According to Morellon *et al*. (2011), "in the context of present-day global warming, there is increased interest in documenting climate variability during the last millennium," since "it is crucial to reconstruct pre-industrial conditions to discriminate anthropogenic components (i.e., greenhouse gases, land-use changes) from natural forcings (i.e., solar variability, volcanic emissions)." Against this backdrop, Morellon *et al*. conducted a multi-proxy study of several short sediment cores they recovered from Lake Estanya (42°02'N, 0°32'E) in the Pre-Pyrenean Ranges of northeast Spain, which "provides a detailed record of the complex environmental, hydrological and anthropogenic interactions occurring in the area since medieval times." More specifically, they say that "the integration of sedimentary facies, elemental and isotopic geochemistry, and biological proxies (diatoms, chironomids and pollen), together with a robust chronological control, provided by AMS radiocarbon dating and 210Pb and 137Cs radiometric techniques, enabled precise reconstruction of the main phases of environmental change, associated with the Medieval Warm Period (MWP), the Little Ice Age (LIA) and the industrial era." And what did they find? The thirteen researchers identified the MWP as occurring in their record from AD 1150 to 1300, noting that their pollen data reflect "warmer and drier conditions," in harmony with the higher temperatures of the Iberian Peninsula over the same time period that have been documented by Martinez-Cortizas *et al*. (1999), the higher temperatures of the Western Mediterranean region found by Taricco *et al*. (2008), and the global reconstructions of Crowley and Lowery (2000) and Osborn and Briffa (2006), which "clearly document warmer conditions from the twelfth to fourteenth centuries," which warmth, in the words of Morellon *et al*. is "likely related to increased solar irradiance (Bard *et al*., 2000), persistent La Niña-like tropical Pacific conditions, a warm phase of the Atlantic Multidecadal Oscillation, and a more frequent positive phase of the North Atlantic Oscillation (Seager *et al*., 2007)." Following hard on the heels of the MWP, Morellon *et al*. note the occurrence of the LIA, which they recognize as occurring from AD 1300 to 1850. And here they report that, on the Iberian Peninsula, "lower temperatures (Martinez-Cortizas *et al*., 1999) characterize this period," which "coincided with colder North Atlantic (Bond *et al*., 2001) and Mediterranean sea surface temperatures (Taricco *et al*., 2008) and a phase of mountain glacier advance (Wanner *et al*., 2008)." And following the LIA they identify the transition period of AD 1850-2004 that takes the region into the Current Warm Period. In discussing all three of these distinctive periods, they say that "a comparison of the main hydrological transitions during the last 800 years in Lake Estanya and solar irradiance (Bard *et al*., 2000) reveals that lower lake levels dominated during periods of enhanced solar activity (MWP and post-1850 AD) and higher lake levels during periods of diminished solar activity (LIA)." And *within* the LIA, they note that periods of higher lake levels or evidence of increased water balance occurred during the solar minima of Wolf (AD 1282-1342), Sporer (AD 1460-1550), Maunder (AD 1645-1715) and Dalton (AD 1790-1830). In light of these several observations it would appear that the multi-centennial climate oscillation uncovered by Morellon *et al*. has been driven by a similar oscillation in solar activity, as well as by multi-decadal solar activity fluctuations superimposed upon that longer-period oscillation. And these relationships suggest that there is no compelling need to attribute 20th-century global warming to the concomitant increase in the air's CO2 content. Natural variability appears quite capable of explaining it all.

#### Negative feedbacks prevent warming

**Evans 12** ­–consultant of the Australian Greenhouse Office/Department of Climate Change, main modeler of carbon in Australia’s biosphere 1999-2005, mathematician, engineer with 6 university degrees, Ph.D. from Stanford in electrical engineering (David. M. W., “The Skeptic’s Case”, 2/24/12; < https://mises.org/daily/5892/The-Skeptics-Case>)//Beddow

The serious skeptical scientists have always agreed with the government climate scientists about the direct effect of CO2. The argument is entirely about the feedbacks. The feedbacks dampen or reduce the direct effect of the extra CO2, cutting it roughly in half.[5] The main feedbacks involve evaporation, water vapor, and clouds. In particular, water vapor condenses into clouds, so extra water vapor due to the direct warming effect of extra CO2 will cause extra clouds, which reflect sunlight back out to space and cool the earth, thereby reducing the overall warming. There are literally thousands of feedbacks, each of which either reinforces or opposes the direct-warming effect of the extra CO2. Almost every long-lived system is governed by net feedback that dampens its response to a perturbation. If a system instead reacts to a perturbation by amplifying it, the system is likely to reach a tipping point and become unstable (like the electronic squeal that erupts when a microphone gets too close to its speakers). The earth's climate is long-lived and stable — it has never gone into runaway greenhouse, unlike Venus — which strongly suggests that the feedbacks dampen temperature perturbations such as that from extra CO2. The climate models have been essentially the same for 30 years now, maintaining roughly the same sensitivity to extra CO2 even while they got more detailed with more computer power. How well have the climate models predicted the temperature? Does the data better support the climate models or the skeptic's view? One of the earliest and most important predictions was presented to the US Congress in 1988 by Dr James Hansen, the "father of global warming": Hansen's climate model clearly exaggerated future temperature rises. In particular, his climate model predicted that if human CO2 emissions were cut back drastically starting in 1988, such that by year 2000 the CO2 level was not rising at all, we would get his scenario C. But in reality the temperature did not even rise this much, even though our CO2 emissions strongly increased — which suggests that the **climate models greatly overestimate the effect of CO2 emissions**. A more considered prediction by the climate models was made in 1990 in the IPCC's First Assessment Report:[8] It's 20 years now, and the average rate of increase in reality is below the lowest trend in the range predicted by the IPCC. Ocean Temperatures The oceans hold the vast bulk of the heat in the climate system. We've only been measuring ocean temperature properly since mid-2003, when the Argo system became operational.[9][10] In Argo, a buoy duck dives down to a depth of 2,000 meters, measures temperatures as it very slowly ascends, then radios the results back to headquarters via satellite. Over 3,000 Argo buoys constantly patrol all the oceans of the world. The ocean temperature has been basically flat since we started measuring it properly, and not warming as quickly as the climate models predict. The climate models predict a particular pattern of atmospheric warming during periods of global warming; the most prominent change they predict is a warming in the tropics about 10 km up, the "hotspot." The hotspot is the sign of the amplification in their theory (see figure 1). The theory says the hotspot is caused by extra evaporation, and by extra water vapor pushing the warmer, wetter lower troposphere up into volume previously occupied by cool dry air. The presence of a hotspot would indicate amplification is occurring, and vice versa. We have been measuring atmospheric temperatures with weather balloons since the 1960s. Millions of weather balloons have built up a good picture of atmospheric temperatures over the last few decades, including the warming period from the late 1970s to the late '90s. This important and pivotal data was not released publicly by the climate establishment until 2006, and then in an obscure place.[13] Here it is: In reality there was no hotspot, not even a small one. So in reality there is no amplification — the amplification shown in figure 1 does not exist.[16] The climate models predict that when the surface of the earth warms, less heat is radiated from the earth into space (on a weekly or monthly time scale). This is because, according to the theory, the warmer surface causes more evaporation and thus there is more heat-trapping water vapor. This is the heat-trapping mechanism that is responsible for the assumed amplification in figure 1. Satellites have been measuring the radiation emitted from the earth for the last two decades. A major study has linked the changes in temperature on the earth's surface with the changes in the outgoing radiation. Here are the results: This shows that in reality the earth gives off more heat when its surface is warmer. This is the opposite of what the climate models predict. This shows that the climate models trap heat too aggressively, and that their assumed amplification shown in figure 1 does not exist. **All the data here is impeccably sourced — satellites, Argo, and weather balloons.[**18] The air and ocean temperature data shows that the climate models overestimate temperature rises. The climate establishment suggest that cooling due to undetected aerosols might be responsible for the failure of the models to date, but this excuse is wearing thin — it continues not to warm as much as they said it would, or in the way they said it would. On the other hand, the rise in air temperature has been greater than the skeptics say could be due to CO2. The skeptic's excuse is that the rise is mainly due to other forces — and they point out that the world has been in a fairly steady warming trend of 0.5°C per century since 1680 (with alternating ~30 year periods of warming and mild cooling) where as the vast bulk of all human CO2 emissions have been after 1945. We've checked all the main predictions of the climate models against the best data: Test Climate Models Air temperatures from 1988 Overestimated rise, even if CO2 is drastically cut Air temperatures from 1990 Overestimated trend rise Ocean temperatures from 2003 Overestimated trend rise greatly Atmospheric hotspot Completely missing → no amplification Outgoing radiation Opposite to reality → no amplification The climate models get them all wrong. The missing hotspot and outgoing radiation data both, independently, prove that the amplification in the climate models is not present. Without the amplification, the climate model temperature predictions would be cut by at least two-thirds, which would explain why they overestimated the recent air and ocean temperature increases. Therefore, The climate models are fundamentally flawed. Their assumed threefold amplification by feedbacks does not in fact exist. The climate models overestimate temperature rises due to CO2 by at least a factor of three. The skeptical view is compatible with the data. The data presented here is impeccably sourced, very relevant, publicly available, and from our best instruments. Yet it never appears in the mainstream media — have you ever seen anything like any of the figures here in the mainstream media? That alone tells you that the "debate" is about politics and power, and not about science or truth. This is an unusual political issue, because there is a right and a wrong answer, and everyone will know which it is eventually. People are going ahead and emitting CO2 anyway, so we are doing the experiment: either the world heats up by several degrees by 2050 or so, or it doesn't. Notice that the skeptics agree with the government climate scientists about the direct effect of CO2; they just disagree about the feedbacks. The climate debate is all about the feedbacks; everything else is merely a sideshow. Yet hardly anyone knows that. The government climate scientists and the mainstream media have framed the debate in terms of the direct effect of CO2 and sideshows such as arctic ice, bad weather, or psychology. They almost never mention the feedbacks. Why is that? Who has the power to make that happen?

#### No extinction

**Carter et. Al 11–** Robert, PhD, Adjuct Research Fellow, James Cook University, Craig Idso, PhD, Chairman at the Center for the Study of Carbon Dioxide and Global Change, Fred Singer, PhD, President of the Science and Environmental Policy Project, Susan Crockford, evolutionary biologist with a specialty in skeletal taxonomy , paleozoology and vertebrate evolution, Joseph D’Aleo, 30 years of experience in professional meteorology, former college professor of Meteorology at Lyndon State College, Indur Goklany, independent scholar, author, and co-editor of the Electronic Journal of Sustainable Development, Sherwood Idso, President of the Center for the Study of Carbon Dioxide and Global Change, Research Physicist with the US Department of Agriculture, Adjunct Professor in the Departments of Geology, Botany, and Microbiology at Arizona State University, Bachelor of Physics, Master of Science, and Doctor of Philosophy, all from the University of Minnesota, Madhav Khandekar, former research scientist from Environment Canada and is an expert reviewer for the IPCC 2007 Climate Change Panel, Anthony Lupo, Department Chair and Professor of Atmospheric Science at the University of Missouri, Willie Soon, astrophysicist at the Solar and Stellar Physics Division of the Harvard-Smithsonian Center for Astrophysics, Mitch Taylor (Canada) (March 8th, “[Surviving](file:///C:\Users\Aron\Dropbox\2013-2014%20Latin%20America%20Topic%20(1)\Team%20Tubs\Marc\Desktop\Surviving) the Unpreceented Climate Change of the IPCC” <http://www.nipccreport.org/articles/2011/mar/8mar2011a5.html>) Jacome

On the other hand, they indicate that some biologists and climatologists have pointed out that "many of the predicted increases in climate have happened before, in terms of both magnitude and rate of change (e.g. Royer, 2008; Zachos *et al*., 2008), and yet biotic communities have remained remarkably resilient (Mayle and Power, 2008) and in some cases thrived (Svenning and Condit, 2008)." But they report that those who mention these things are often "placed in the 'climate-change denier' category," although the purpose for pointing out these facts is simply to present "a sound scientific basis for understanding biotic responses to the magnitudes and rates of climate change predicted for the future through using the vast data resource that we can exploit in fossil records." Going on to do just that, Willis *et al*. focus on "intervals in time in the fossil record when atmospheric CO2 concentrations increased up to 1200 ppm, temperatures in mid- to high-latitudes increased by greater than 4°C within 60 years, and sea levels rose by up to 3 m higher than present," describing studies of past biotic responses that indicate "the scale and impact of the magnitude and rate of such climate changes on biodiversity." And what emerges from those studies, as they describe it, "is evidence for rapid community turnover, migrations, development of novel ecosystems and thresholds from one stable ecosystem state to another." And, most importantly in this regard, they report "there is very little evidence for broad-scale extinctions due to a warming world." In concluding, the Norwegian, Swedish and UK researchers say that "based on such evidence we urge some caution in assuming broad-scale extinctions of species will occur due solely to climate changes of the magnitude and rate predicted for the next century," reiterating that "the fossil record indicates remarkable biotic resilience to wide amplitude fluctuations in climate.

#### Animals will adapt to ocean acid --- their studies are flawed.

**Schlengel et al 2012** - Peter Schlegel, Department of Biological Sciences, Macquarie University, Sydney, Australia, Jon N. Havenhand, Department of Biological & Environmental Sciences, University of Gothenburg, Tjärnö Marine Biological Laboratory, Strömstad, Sweden, Michael R. Gillings, Department of Biological Sciences, Macquarie University, Sydney, Australia, Jane E. Williamson, Department of Biological Sciences, Macquarie University, Sydney, Australia, “Individual Variability in Reproductive Success Determines Winners and Losers under Ocean Acidification: A Case Study with Sea Urchins,” <http://www.plosone.org/article/info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.pone.0053118>)//a-berg

Environmental factors directly affect populations by selecting resilient individuals. Selection at the gametic level, or during early life, has strong and immediate effects at the population level, carrying over into subsequent life stages. Heritability of this resilience leads to cascading adaptive effects in subsequent generations. For example, in free-spawning marine organisms, sperm selection during fertilization plays a key role by determining the nature and diversity of genotypes in the subsequent generation [1], [2] and thus their resilience to environmental change. Rising atmospheric carbon dioxide levels are a key driver of environmental change, and will likely lead to rapid ocean acidification [3], [4]. With gametes possessing no, or only limited, buffering capacities against CO2-mediated pH changes in seawater, the dynamics of fertilization and subsequent development are likely to be affected in all free-spawning marine organisms, with potentially severe implications [5], [6]. Yet we know little about the relative fitness of individuals within species under the predicted acidification of the ocean. The sensitivity of reproductive processes to ocean acidification has thus far been assessed from mean responses of mixtures of gametes and/or larvae obtained from multiple individuals [7]–[10] (but see [11]). However, the key determinant of reproductive success in a future ocean is not the average response, but the proportion of successful offspring contributed by each individual under the changed environmental conditions. Individual-level responses to ocean acidification have been examined to some extent in larval development processes [12], [13], but not closely in fertilization processes. In this context, the importance of naturally high variability that is observed in fertilization success of individual pairwise crosses [14], [15] becomes apparent: not all matings are equal. Consequently, acidification-mediated impacts on reproductive success and subsequent development might result in flow-on consequences for genetic diversity and population demographics [12].

#### A) Biodiversity predictions are guess work – we don’t know how species are interconnected.

**O’Riordan and Kleeman, 02**(Tim O'Riordan and Susanne Stoll-Kleemann, Tim was the Professor of Environmental Sciences at the University of East Anglia and Susanne studied geography and social sciences at the Technical University of Berlin where she also received her PhD and she serves as Full Professor and Chair of Applied Geography and Sustainability Science at the University of Greifswald, 02. (“Biodiversity, Sustainability, and Human Communities: Protecting beyond the Protected.” Pg. 3. Columbian University Press. Questia. <http://www.questia.com/read/105051583?title=Biodiversity,%20Sustainability,%20and%20Human%20Communities:%20%20Protecting%20beyond%20the%20Protected>) QP

This planet is unique, at least as far as we will probably ever know. It contains life, which is maintained through self-regulating flows of energy and chemical connections, the science of which is well described by Tim Lenton (98).We also know that these webs of life are frayed (World Resources Institute 00). We are by no means clear as to how much these life-maintaining flows and fluxes are damaged. An assessment by the World Resources Institute (00: 9) entitled Pilot Analysis of Global Ecosystems (PAGE)indicates that there is still a fundamental ignorance of how this web joins, and of what it consists at any scale of analysis, or of human action. The Board on Sustainable Development of the US National Research Council (99: 208, 220–1) points out that this ignorance is all the more worrying because of the complex multiple causes and consequences of this disruption. One of the major threats to ecosystem goods and services is our lack of understanding about how specific ecosystem functions may change with ecosystem transformations. Another cause for concern is our hesitation about deciding on options for coping with and ameliorating these fundamental changes. A third limitation is lack of knowledge about, or incorrect valuation of, the 'worth' of ecosystem functioning for social well-being and economic advantage. A study attempting to calculate the 'worth' of ecosystem services(Costanza et al. 97)came up with a range of estimates on the basis of heroic estimates and ingenious assumptions. These estimates all exceeded the current value of total economic activity for the globe, on an annual basis, by a factor of up to threefold.Frankly there is no way of knowing how accurate this calculation is.What is revealing is that a clever monetary estimate indicates our scale of dependency or 'free riding' on the web of interconnected life. More relevant, perhaps, is the danger of trying to place a market-equivalent value on a mystery for which we should be more in awe than in arithmetic.

#### B) Biodiversity is a diluted and overhyped concept contributed to by unqualified scientists.

**The Daily Rising Kashmir, 09**. (“‘Conservation, exploration of biodiversity should go hand in hand.’” <http://www.risingkashmir.com/?option=com_content&task=view&id=11576>) QP

The seminar “Biodiversity: Present Status and Future Challenges” organized by the varsity’s Botany department was addressed by Minister of Education, Peerzada Muhammad Syed, Vice Chancellor, Prof Riyaz Punjabi, Registrar, Prof S N Raina of Delhi University, Prof Syed Fayaz, Head Botany department, G H Dar and organizing secretary of the **conference, Dr Zafar Reshi.**Speaking on the occasion, Prof Raina said, “Conservation has become a buzz word and people who don’t know even the basics of the subject deliver sermons on it. It is ironic that at times physicists, chemists speak on the need of conservation. Even biologists who don’t have the knowledge of biodiversity deliver speeches.” “This intervention of unknowledgeable people has made the concept of biodiversity vague and diluted,” he added.

#### No impact to the environment

**Sagoff 97**  Mark, Senior Research Scholar – Institute for Philosophy and Public policy in School of Public Affairs – U. Maryland, William and Mary Law Review, “INSTITUTE OF BILL OF RIGHTS LAW SYMPOSIUM DEFINING TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE FUTURE OF GOVERNMENT REGULATION: MUDDLE OR MUDDLE THROUGH? TAKINGS JURISPRUDENCE MEETS THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT”, 38 Wm and Mary L. Rev. 825, March, L/N

Note – Colin Tudge - Research Fellow at the Centre for Philosophy at the London School of Economics. Frmr Zoological Society of London: Scientific Fellow and tons of other positions. PhD. Read zoology at Cambridge.

Simon Levin = Moffet Professor of Biology, Princeton. 2007 American Institute of Biological Sciences Distinguished Scientist Award 2008 Istituto Veneto di Scienze Lettere ed Arti 2009 Honorary Doctorate of Science, Michigan State University 2010 Eminent Ecologist Award, Ecological Society of America 2010 Margalef Prize in Ecology, etc… PhD

Although one may agree with ecologists such as Ehrlich and Raven that the earth stands on **the brink of** an episode of **massive extinction, it may not follow** from this grim fact **that human** being**s will suffer** as a result. On the contrary, skeptics such as science writer Colin Tudge have challenged biologists to explain **why we need more than a tenth of the 10 to 100 million species that grace the earth**. Noting that "cultivated systems often out-produce wild systems by 100-fold or more," Tudge declared that "the argument that humans need the variety of other species is, when you think about it, a theological one." n343 Tudge observed that "the elimination of all but a tiny minority **of our fellow creatures does not affect the material well-being of humans** one iota."n344 This skeptic challenged ecologists to list more than 10,000 species (other than unthreatened microbes) that are essential to ecosystem productivity or functioning. n345 "**The human species could survive just as well** if 99.9% of our fellow creatures went extinct, provided only that we retained the appropriate 0.1% that we need." n346   [\*906]   The monumental Global Biodiversity Assessment ("the Assessment") identified two positions with respect to redundancy of species. "At one extreme is the idea that each species is unique and important, such that its removal or loss will have demonstrable consequences to the functioning of the community or ecosystem." n347 The authors of the Assessment, a panel of eminent ecologists, endorsed this position, saying it is "unlikely that there is much, if any, ecological redundancy in communities over time scales of decades to centuries, the time period over which environmental policy should operate." n348 These eminent ecologists rejected the opposing view, "the notion that species overlap in function to a sufficient degree that removal or loss of a species will be compensated by others, with negligible overall consequences to the community or ecosystem." n349  Other biologists believe, however, that species are so fabulously redundant in the ecological functions they perform that the life-support systems and processes of the planet and ecological processes in general will function perfectly well with fewer of them, certainly fewer than the millions and millions we can expect to remain **even if** **every threatened organism becomes extinct**. n350 Even the kind of sparse and miserable world depicted in the movie Blade Runner could provide a "sustainable" context for the human economy as long as people forgot their aesthetic and moral commitment to the glory and beauty of the natural world. n351 The Assessment makes this point. "Although any ecosystem contains hundreds to thousands of species interacting among themselves and their physical environment, the emerging consensus is that the system is driven by a small number of . . . biotic variables on whose interactions the balance of species are, in a sense, carried along." n352   [\*907]   To make up your mind on the question of the functional redundancy of species, consider an endangered species of bird, plant, or insect and ask how the ecosystem would fare in its absence. The fact that the creature is endangered suggests an answer: it is already in limbo as far as ecosystem processes are concerned. What crucial ecological services does the black-capped vireo, for example, serve? Are any of the species threatened with extinction necessary to the provision of any ecosystem service on which humans depend? If so, which ones are they?  Ecosystems and the species that compose them have changed, dramatically, continually, and totally in virtually every part of the United States. There is little ecological similarity, for example, between New England today and the land where the Pilgrims died. n353 In view of the constant reconfiguration of the biota, **one may wonder why Americans have not suffered more as a result of ecological catastrophes**. The cast of species in nearly every environment changes constantly-local extinction is commonplace in nature-but the crops still grow. Somehow, it seems, property values keep going up on Martha's Vineyard in spite of the tragic disappearance of the heath hen.  One might argue that the sheer number and variety of creatures available to any ecosystem buffers that system against stress. Accordingly, we should be concerned if the "library" of creatures ready, willing, and able to colonize ecosystems gets too small. (Advances in genetic engineering may well permit us to write a large number of additions to that "library.") In the United States as in many other parts of the world, however, the number of species has been increasing dramatically, not decreasing, as a result of human activity. This is because the hordes of exotic species coming into ecosystems in the United States far exceed the number of species that are becoming extinct. Indeed, introductions may outnumber extinctions by more than ten to one, so that the United States is becoming more and more species-rich all the time largely as a result of human action. n354 [\*908] Peter Vitousek and colleagues estimate that over 1000 non-native plants grow in California alone; in Hawaii there are 861; in Florida, 1210. n355 In Florida more than 1000 non-native insects, 23 species of mammals, and about 11 exotic birds have established themselves. n356 Anyone who waters a lawn or hoes a garden knows how many weeds desire to grow there, how many birds and bugs visit the yard, and how many fungi, creepy-crawlies, and other odd life forms show forth when it rains. All belong to nature, from wherever they might hail, but not many homeowners would claim that there are too few of them. Now, not all exotic species provide ecosystem services; indeed, some may be disruptive or have no instrumental value. n357 This also may be true, of course, of native species as well, especially because all exotics are native somewhere. Certain exotic species, however, such as Kentucky blue grass, establish an area's sense of identity and place; others, such as the green crabs showing up around Martha's Vineyard, are nuisances. n358 Consider an analogy [\*909] with human migration. Everyone knows that after a generation or two, immigrants to this country are hard to distinguish from everyone else. The vast majority of Americans did not evolve here, as it were, from hominids; most of us "came over" at one time or another. This is true of many of our fellow species as well, and they may fit in here just as well as we do. It is possible to distinguish exotic species from native ones for a period of time, just as we can distinguish immigrants from native-born Americans, but as the centuries roll by, species, like people, fit into the landscape or the society, changing and often enriching it. Shall we have a rule that a species had to come over on the Mayflower, as so many did, to count as "truly" American? Plainly not. When, then, is the cutoff date? Insofar as we are concerned with the absolute numbers of "rivets" holding ecosystems together, extinction seems not to pose a general problem because a far greater number of kinds of mammals, insects, fish, plants, and other creatures thrive on land and in water in America today than in prelapsarian times. n359 The Ecological Society of America has urged managers to maintain biological diversity as a critical component in strengthening ecosystems against disturbance. n360 Yet as Simon Levin observed, "much of the detail about species composition will be irrelevant in terms of influences on ecosystem properties." n361 [\*910] He added: "For net primary productivity, as is likely to be the case for any system property, **biodiversity matters only up to a point**; above a certain level, increasing biodiversity is likely to make **little difference**." n362 What about the use of plants and animals in agriculture? There is no scarcity foreseeable. "Of an estimated 80,000 types of plants [we] know to be edible," a U.S. Department of the Interior document says, "only about 150 are extensively cultivated." n363 About twenty species, not one of which is endangered, provide ninety percent of the food the world takes from plants. n364 Any new food has to take "shelf space" or "market share" from one that is now produced. Corporations also find it difficult to create demand for a new product; for example, people are not inclined to eat paw-paws, even though they are delicious. It is hard enough to get people to eat their broccoli and lima beans. It is harder still to develop consumer demand for new foods. This may be the reason the Kraft Corporation does not prospect in remote places for rare and unusual plants and animals to add to the world's diet. Of the roughly 235,000 flowering plants and 325,000 nonflowering plants (including mosses, lichens, and seaweeds) available, farmers ignore virtually all of them in favor of a very few that are profitable. n365 To be sure, any of the more than 600,000 species of plants could have an application in agriculture, but would they be preferable to the species that are now dominant? Has anyone found any consumer demand for any of these half-million or more plants to replace rice or wheat in the human diet? There are reasons that farmers cultivate rice, wheat, and corn rather than, say, Furbish's lousewort. There are many kinds of louseworts, so named because these weeds were thought to cause lice in sheep. How many does agriculture really require? [\*911] The species on which agriculture relies are domesticated, not naturally occurring; they are developed by artificial not natural selection; they might not be able to survive in the wild. n366 This argument is not intended to deny the religious, aesthetic, cultural, and moral reasons that command us to respect and protect the natural world. These spiritual and ethical values should evoke action, of course, but we should also recognize that they are spiritual and ethical values. We should recognize that ecosystems and all that dwell therein compel our moral respect, our aesthetic appreciation, and our spiritual veneration; we should clearly seek to achieve the goals of the ESA. There is no reason to assume, however, that these goals have anything to do with human well-being or welfare as economists understand that term. These are ethical goals, in other words, not economic ones. Protecting the marsh may be the right thing to do for moral, cultural, and spiritual reasons. We should do it-but someone will have to pay the costs. In the narrow sense of promoting human welfare, protecting nature often represents a net "cost," not a net "benefit." It is largely for moral, not economic, reasons-ethical, not prudential, reasons- that we care about all our fellow creatures. They are valuable as objects of love not as objects of use. What is good for   [\*912]  the marsh may be good in itself even if it is not, in the economic sense, good for mankind. The most valuable things are quite useless.

#### Status Quo Solves- Organic farmland will bolster biodiversity.

**NERC, 09**(Natural Environmental Research Center, March 13, 09. (“Organic farms could form hotspots of biodiversity.” Planet Earth Online. <http://planetearth.nerc.ac.uk/news/story.aspx?id=357>) QP

Resurgent awareness of the need to provide for a fast-growing population is likely to mean a move in conservation from managing farmland so as to maximise biodiversity to trying to make the landscape as biodiverse as possiblewhile also producing enough food. One possible solution isto make non-organic farming as intensive as possible in the areas that suit it, to maximise food production, whileusing organic farms as 'islands of biodiversity' where conditions suit them.The world's population is predicted to grow by around 40 per cent by mid-century, and factors like increasing use of biofuel crops and the effects of climate change are likely to affect the amount of land on which food can be grown. The result will be unprecedented pressure on agricultural production. 'The global food crisis and the pressure it brings to increase food yields may shift our perceptions of how we should conserve biodiversity,' says Dr Doreen Gabriel, an ecologist in the Institute of Integrative and Comparative Biology at the University of Leeds and the paper's lead author. 'Conservation strategies will shift from asking simply how we enhance biodiversity to asking how we can enhance biodiversity under the constraints of food production.' Organic farming is often seen as more wildlife-friendly, because it provides wild plants and animals with a much greater range of potential habitats. It has become far more popular in recent years, with organically-cultivated land in Britain increasing from around 50,000 hectares before 97 to around 680,000 hectares ten years later.

#### Alt causes – overhunting, unintentional killing and pollution.

Eiperin 8 (October 7. Juliet. Washington Post. <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/10/06/AR2008100600641.html> Pismarov)

At least a quarter of the world's wild mammal species are at risk of extinction, according to a comprehensive global survey releasedhere Monday. The new assessment -- which took 1,700 experts in 130 countries five years to complete -- paints "a bleak picture," leaders of the project wrote in a paper being published in the journal Science. The overview, made public at the quadrennial World Conservation Congress of the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN), covers all 5,487 wild species identified since 1500. It is the most thorough tally of land and marine mammals since 1996. "Mammals are definitely declining, and the driving factors are habitat destruction and over-harvesting," said Jan Schipper, the paper's lead writer and the IUCN's global mammals assessment coordinator.The researchers concluded that 25 percent of the mammal species for which they had sufficient data are threatened with extinction, but Schipper added that the figure could be as high as 36 percent because information on some species is so scarce.Land and marine mammals face different threats, the scientists said, and large mammals are more vulnerable than small ones. For land species, habitat loss and hunting represent the greatest danger, while marine mammals are more threatened by unintentional killing by pollution, ship strikes and being caught in fishing nets.

# 2nc

## hotspots

### 2nc walt

#### These warrants are comparatively more important

Brooks et al, their ev, 13 [Stephen G. Brooks is Associate Professor of Government at Dartmouth College.G. John Ikenberry is the Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University in the Department of Politics and the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs. He is also a Global Eminence Scholar at Kyung Hee University.William C. Wohlforth is the Daniel Webster Professor in the Department of Government at Dartmouth College. “Don't Come Home, America: The Case against Retrenchment”, Winter 2013, Vol. 37, No. 3, Pages 7-51,[http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/abs/10.1162/ISEC\_a\_00107](http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/abs/10.1162/ISEC_a_00107" \t "_blank), GDI File]

  A core premise of deep engagement is that it prevents the emergence of a far more dangerous global security environment. For one thing, as noted above, the United States’ overseas presence gives it the leverage to restrain partners from taking provocative action. Perhaps more important, its core alliance commitments also deter states with aspirations to regional hegemony from contemplating expansion and make its partners more secure, reducing their incentive to adopt solutions to their security problems that threaten others and thus stoke security dilemmas. The contention that engaged U.S. power dampens the baleful effects of anarchy is consistent with influential variants of realist theory. Indeed, arguably the scariest portrayal of the war-prone world that would emerge absent the “American Pacifier” is provided in the works of John Mearsheimer, who forecasts dangerous multipolar regions replete with security competition, arms races, nuclear proliferation and associated preventive wartemptations, regional rivalries, and even runs at regional hegemony and full-scale great power war. 72 How do retrenchment advocates, the bulk of whom are realists, discount this benefit? Their arguments are complicated, but two capture most of the variation: (1) U.S. security guarantees are not necessary to prevent dangerous rivalries and conflict in Eurasia; or (2) prevention of rivalry and conflict in Eurasia is not a U.S. interest. Each response is connected to a different theory or set of theories, which makes sense given that the whole debate hinges on a complex future counterfactual (what would happen to Eurasia’s security setting if the United States truly disengaged?). Although a certain answer is impossible, each of these responses is nonetheless a weaker argument for retrenchment than advocates acknowledge. The first response flows from defensive realism as well as other international relations theories that discount the conflict-generating potential of anarchy under contemporary conditions. 73 Defensive realists maintain that the high expected costs of territorial conquest, defense dominance, and an array of policies and practices that can be used credibly to signal benign intent, mean that Eurasia’s major states could manage regional multipolarity peacefully without theAmerican pacifier. Retrenchment would be a bet on this scholarship, particularly in regions where the kinds of stabilizers that nonrealist theories point to—such as democratic governance or dense institutional linkages—are either absent or weakly present. There are three other major bodies of scholarship, however, that might give decisionmakers pause before making this bet. First is regional expertise. Needless to say, there is no consensus on the net security effects of U.S. withdrawal. Regarding each region, there are optimists and pessimists. Few experts expect a return of intense great power competition in a post-American Europe, but many doubt European governments will pay the political costs of increased EU defense cooperation and the budgetary costs of increasing military outlays. 74 The result might be a Europe that is incapable of securing itself from various threats that could be destabilizing within the region and beyond (e.g., a regional conflict akin to the 1990s Balkan wars), lacks capacity for global security missions in which U.S. leaders might want European participation, and is vulnerable to the influence of outside rising powers. What about the other parts of Eurasia where the United States has a substantial military presence? Regarding the Middle East, the balance begins toswing toward pessimists concerned that states currently backed by Washington— notably Israel, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia—might take actions upon U.S. retrenchment that would intensify security dilemmas. And concerning East Asia, pessimismregarding the region’s prospects without the American pacifier is pronounced. Arguably the principal concern expressed by area experts is that Japan and South Korea are likely to obtain a nuclear capacity and increase their military commitments, which could stoke a destabilizing reaction from China. It is notable that during the Cold War, both South Korea and Taiwan moved to obtain a nuclear weapons capacity and were only constrained from doing so by astill-engaged United States. 75 The second body of scholarship casting doubt on the bet on defensive realism’s sanguine portrayal is all of the research that undermines its conception of state preferences. Defensive realism’s optimism about what would happen if the United States retrenched is very much dependent on itsparticular—and highly restrictive—assumption about state preferences; once we relax this assumption, then much of its basis for optimism vanishes. Specifically, the prediction of post-American tranquility throughout Eurasia rests on the assumption that security is the only relevant state preference, with security defined narrowly in terms of protection from violent external attacks on the homeland. Under that assumption, the security problem is largely solved as soon as offense and defense are clearly distinguishable, and offense is extremely expensive relative to defense. Burgeoning research across the social and other sciences, however,undermines that core assumption: states have preferences not only for security but also for prestige, status, and other aims, and theyengage in trade-offs among the various objectives. 76 In addition, they define security not just in terms of territorial protection but in view of many and varied milieu goals. It follows that even states that are relatively secure may nevertheless engage in highly competitive behavior. Empirical studies show that this is indeed sometimes the case. 77 In sum, a bet on a benign postretrenchment Eurasia is a bet that leaders of major countries will never allow these nonsecurity preferences to influence their strategic choices. To the degree that these bodies of scholarly knowledge have predictive leverage, U.S. retrenchment would result in a significant deterioration in the security environment in at least some of the world’s key regions. We have already mentioned the third, even more alarming body of scholarship. Offensive realism predicts thatthe withdrawal of the American pacifier will yield either a competitive regional multipolarity complete with associated insecurity, arms racing, crisis instability, nuclear proliferation, and the like, or bids for regional hegemony, which may be beyond the capacity of local great powers to contain (and which in any case would generate intensely competitive behavior, possibly including regional great power war).

#### Empirics and most comprehensive study goes neg.

Fettweis 8 (Christopher – professor of political science at Tulane, Credibility and the War on Terror, Political Science Quarterly, Winter, GDI File)

Since Vietnam, scholars have been generally unable to **identify** cases in which high credibility helped the **U**nited **S**tates **achieve its goals.** The shortterm aftermath of the Cuban Missile Crisis, for example, did not include a string of Soviet reversals, or the kind of benign bandwagoning with the West that deterrence theorists would have expected. In fact, the perceived reversal in Cuba seemed to harden Soviet resolve. As the crisis was drawing to a close, Soviet diplomat Vasily Kuznetsov angrily told his counterpart, "You Americans will never be able to do this to us again."37 Kissinger commented in his memoirs that "the Soviet Union thereupon launched itself on a determined, systematic, and long-term program of expanding all categories of its military power .... The 1962 Cuban crisis was thus a historic turning point-but not for the reason some Americans complacently supposed."38 The reassertion of the credibility of the United States, which was done at the brink of nuclear war, had fesw long-lasting benefits. The Soviets seemed to learn the wrong lesson. There is actually **scant evidence** that other states ever learn the right lessons. Cold War history contains **little reason** to believe that the credibility of the superpowers had very much effect on their ability to **influence** **others**. Over the last decade, a series of major scholarly studies have cast further **doubt** upon the **fundamental assumption** of interdependence across foreign policy actions. Employing methods borrowed from social psychology rather than the economics-based models commonly employed by deterrence theorists, Jonathan Mercer argued that threats are far more independent than is commonly believed and, therefore, that reputations are **not likely** to be formed on the basis of **individual actions**.39 While policymakers may feel that their decisions send messages about their basic dispositions to others, most of the evidence from social psychology suggests otherwise. Groups tend to interpret the actions of their rivals as situational, **dependent** upon the constraints of **place** and **time**. Therefore, they are not likely to form **lasting** **impressions** of irresolution from **single**, independent **events**. Mercer argued that the interdependence assumption had been accepted on faith, and rarely put to a coherent test; when it was, it almost inevitably failed.40

### 2nc terror

#### Terrorism is low probability and low impact – can be contained and prevented

**Gross and Gilles 4/23** – director of Internet Communications for Howard Dean’s 2004 campaign, and director of Sol Kula Healing (April 23 2012, Matthey Barrett and Mel, “How Apocalyptic Thinking Prevents Us from Taking Political Action,” <http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2012/04/the-perils-of-apocalyptic-thinking/255758/>, mrs)

Nothing inspires fear like the end of the world, and ever since Y2K, the media's tendency toward overwrought speculation has been increasingly married to the rhetoric of apocalypse. Today, nearly any event can be explained through apocalyptic language, from birds falling out of the sky (the Birdocalypse?) to a major nor'easter (Snowmageddon!) to a double-dip recession (Barackalypse! Obamageddon!). Armageddon is here at last -- and your local news team is live on the scene! We've seen the equivalent of grade inflation (A for Apocalypse!) for every social, political, or ecological challenge before us, an escalating game of one-upmanship to gain the public's attention. Why worry about global warming and rising sea levels when the collapse of the housing bubble has already put your mortgage underwater? Why worry that increasing droughts will threaten the supply of drinking water in America's major cities when a far greater threat lies in the possibility of an Arab terrorist poisoning that drinking supply, resulting in millions of casualties?

Yet not all of the crises or potential threats before us are equal, nor are they equally probable -- a fact that gets glossed over when the media equate the remote threat of a possible event, like epidemics, with real trends like global warming.

Over the last decade, the 24-hour news cycle and the proliferation of media channels has created ever-more apocalyptic content that is readily available to us, from images of the Twin Towers falling in 2001 to images of the Japanese tsunami in 2011. So, too, have cable channels like Discovery and History married advances in computer-generated imagery with emerging scientific understanding of our planet and universe to give visual validity to the rare and catastrophic events that have occurred in the past or that may take place in the distant future. Using dramatic, animated images and the language of apocalypse to peddle such varied scenarios, however, has the effect of leveling the apocalyptic playing field, leaving the viewer with the impression that terrorism, bird flu, global warming, and asteroids are all equally probable. But not all of these apocalyptic scenarios are equally likely, and they're certainly not equally likely to occur within our lifetimes -- or in our neighborhoods. For example, **after millions of Americans witnessed the attacks of 9/11 on television, our collective fear of terrorism was much higher than its actual probability; in 2001, terrorists killed one-twelfth as many Americans as did the flu and one-fifteenth as many Americans as did car accidents**. Throughout the first decade of the 21st century, the odds of an American being killed by a terrorist were about 1 in 88,000 -- compared to a 1 in 10,010 chance of dying from falling off a ladder. The fears of an outbreak of SARS, avian flu, or swine flu also never lived up to their media hype.

This over-reliance on the apocalyptic narrative causes us to fear the wrong things and to mistakenly equate potential future events with current and observable trends. How to discern the difference between so many apocalyptic options? If we ask ourselves three basic questions about the many threats portrayed apocalyptically in the media, we are able to separate the apocalyptic wheat from the chaff. Which scenarios are probable? Which are preventable? And what is the likely impact of the worst-case model of any given threat?

In answering these questions, it becomes clear that much of what the media portrays as apocalyptic is not. The apocalyptic scenarios involving global disaster -- from meteor impacts to supervolcanic eruptions -- are **extraordinarily** rare. An asteroid could hit the Earth and lead to the extinction of all mammals, including us, but the geologic record tells us that such massive strikes are unlikely, and logic tells us that there is little we can do to prevent one. Nor are terrorist attacks or an outbreak of avian flu likely to destroy humanity; their impact is relatively small and usually localized, because we can be prepared for such threats and can contain and mitigate their effects. The apocalyptic storyline tells us that most of these events are probable, largely unpreventable, and destined to be catastrophic. But none of this is true -- their probability is either low or can be made lower through preventive means, or their impact is containable.

## sugar

### 2nc no wars

#### And, here’s evidence that goes more in depth on these points

**Deudney 1999** (Daniel, Asst Prof of Poli Sci at Johns Hopkins, Contested Grounds: Security and Conflict in the New Environmental Politics )

The hypothesis that states will begin fighting each other as natural resources are depleted and degraded seems intuitively accurate. The popular metaphor of a lifeboat adrift at sea with declining supplies of clean water and rations suggests there will be fewer opportunities for positive-sum gains between actors as resource scarcity grows. Many fears of resource war are derived from the cataclysmic world wars of the first half of the twentieth century. Influenced by geopolitical theories that emphasized the importance of land and resources for great power status, Adolf Hitler fashioned Nazi German war aims to achieve resource autonomy. 40 The aggression of Japan was directly related to resource goals: lacking indigenous fuel and minerals, and faced with a slowly tightening embargo by the Western colonial powers in Asia, the Japanese invaded Southeast Asia for oil, tin, and rubber.41 Although the United States had a richer resource endowment than the Axis powers, fears of shortages and industrial strangulation played a central role in the strategic thinking of American elites about world strategy.42 During the Cold War, the presence of natural resources in the Third World helped turn this vast area into an arena for East-West conflict.43 Given this record, the scenario of conflicts over resources playing a powerful role in shaping international order should be taken seriously. However, there are three strong reasons for concluding that the familiar scenarios of resource war are of **diminishing plausibility** for the foreseeable future. First, the robust character of the **world trade** system means that states no longer experience resource dependency as a major threat to their military security and political autonomy. During the 1930s, the collapse of the world trading system drove states to pursue economic autarky, but the resource needs of contemporary states are routinely met **without territorial control** of the resource source. As Ronnie Lipschutz has argued, this means that resource constraints are much less likely to generate interstate violence than in the past. Second, the prospects for resource wars are diminished by the growing difficulty that states face in obtaining resources through territorial conquest. Although the invention of nuclear explosives has made it easy and cheap to annihilate humans and infrastructure in extensive areas, the **spread of conventional weaponry** and national consciousness has made it very costly for an invader, even one equipped with advanced technology, to subdue a resisting population, as France discovered in Indochina and Algeria, the United States in Vietnam, and the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. 45 At the lower levels of violence capability that matter most for conquering and subduing territory, the great powers have lost effective military superiority and are unlikely soon to regain it. Third, nonrenewable resources are, contrary to intuitive logic, becoming less economically scarce. There is strong evidence that the world is entering what H. E. Goeller and Alvin M. Weinberg have labeled the "age of substitutability," in which industrial **technology** is increasingly capable of fashioning ubiquitous and plentiful earth materials such as iron, aluminum, silicon, and hydrocarbons into virtually **everything needed** by modern societies.46 The most striking manifestation of this trend is that prices for virtually every raw material have been stagnant or falling for the last two decades despite the continued growth in world economic output. In contrast to the expectations widely held during the 1970s that resource scarcity would drive up commodity prices to the benefit of Third World raw material suppliers, prices have fallen.47

#### There is no plausible scenario for resource wars

**Victor, 07** – Senior Fellow @ Stanford Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies and the Woods Institute for the Environment (David, “What Resource Wars?”, 11/1/2007, http://goliath.ecnext.com/coms2/gi\_0199-7344601/What-resource-wars-From-Arabia.html)

THE SECOND surge in thinking about resource wars comes from all the money that is pulsing into resource-rich countries. There is no question that the revenues are huge. OPEC cashed $650 billion for 11.7 billion barrels of the oil it sold in 2006, compared with $110 billion in 1998, when it sold a similar quantity of oil at much lower prices. Russia's Central Bank reports that the country earned more than $300 billion selling oil and gas in 2006, about four times its annual haul in the late 1990s. But will this flood in rents cause conflict and war? There is no question that large revenues--regardless of the source--can fund a lot of mischievous behavior. Iran is building a nuclear-weapons program with the revenues from its oil exports. Russia has funded trouble in Chechnya, Georgia and other places with oil and gas rents. Hugo Chavez opened Venezuela's bulging checkbook to help populists in Bolivia and to poke America in ways that could rekindle smoldering conflicts. Islamic terrorists also have benefited, in part, from oil revenues that leak out of oil-rich societies or are channeled directly from sympathetic governments. But resource-related conflicts are multi-causal. In no case would simply cutting the resources avoid or halt conflict, even if the presence of natural resources can shift the odds. Certainly, oil revenues have advanced Iran's nuclear program, which is a potential source of hot conflict and could make future conflicts a lot more dangerous. But a steep decline in oil probably wouldn't strangle the program on its own. Indeed, while Iran still struggles to make a bomb, resource-poor North Korea has already arrived at that goal by starving itself and getting help from friends. Venezuela's checkbook allows Chavez to be a bigger thorn in the sides of those he dislikes, but there are other thorns that poke without oil money. As we see, what matters is not just money but how it is used. While Al-Qaeda conjures images of an oil-funded network--because it hails from the resource-rich Middle East and its seed capital has oily origins--other lethal terror networks, such as Sri Lanka's Tamil Tigers and Ireland's Republican Army, arose with funding from diasporas rather than oil or other natural resources. Unlike modern state armies that require huge infusions of capital, terror networks are usually organized to make the most of scant funds. During the run-up in oil and gas prices, analysts have often claimed that these revenues will go to fund terror networks; yet it is sobering to remember that Al-Qaeda came out in the late 1990s, when oil earnings were at their lowest in recent history. Most of the tiny sums of money needed for the September 11 attacks came from that period. Al-Qaeda's daring attacks against the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania occurred when oil-rich patrons were fretting about the inability to make ends meet at home because revenues were so low. Ideology and organization trump money as driving forces for terrorism. Most thinking about resource-lubed conflict has concentrated on the ways that windfalls from resources cause violence by empowering belligerent states or sub-state actors. But the chains of cause and effect are more varied. For states with weak governance and resources that are easy to grab, resources tend to make weak states even weaker and raise the odds of hot conflict. This was true for Angola's diamonds and Nigeria's oil, which in both cases have helped finance civil war. For states with stable authoritarian governments--such as Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, most of the rest in the western Gulf, and perhaps also Russia and Venezuela--the problem may be the opposite. A sharp decline in resource revenues can create dangerous vacuums where expectations are high and paltry distributions discredit the established authorities. On balance, the windfall in oil revenues over recent years is probably breeding more conflict than would a crash in prices. However, while a few conflicts partly trace themselves to resources, it is the other pernicious effects of resource windfalls, such as the undermining of democratic transitions and the failure of most resource-reliant societies to organize their economies around investment and productivity, that matter much, much more. At best, resources have indirect and mixed effects on conflict. Climate Dangers THE THIRD avenue for concern about coming resource wars is through the dangers of global climate change. The litany is now familiar. Sea levels will rise, perhaps a lot; storms will probably become more intense; dry areas are prone to parch further and wet zones are likely to soak longer. And on top of those probable effects, unchecked climate change raises the odds of suffering nasty surprises if the world's climate and ecosystems respond in abrupt ways. Adding all that together, the scenarios are truly disturbing. Meaningful action to stem the dangers is long overdue.In the United States over the last year, the traditional security community has become engaged on these issues. Politically, that conversion has been touted as good news because the odds of meaningful policy are higher if hawks also favor action. Their concerns are seen through the lens of resource wars, with fears such as: water shortages that amplify grievances and trigger conflict; migrations of "climate refugees", which could stress border controls and also cause strife if the displaced don't fit well in their new societies; and diseases such as malaria that could be harder to contain if tropical conditions are more prevalent, which in turn could stress health-care systems and lead to hot wars.While there are many reasons to fear global warming, the risk that such dangers could cause violent conflict ranks extremely low on the list because it is highly unlikely to materialize. Despite decades of warnings about water wars, what is striking is that water wars don't happen--usually because countries that share water resources have a lot more at stake and armed conflict rarely fixes the problem. Some analysts have pointed to conflicts over resources, including water and valuable land, as a cause in the Rwandan genocide, for example. Recently, the UN secretary-general suggested that climate change was already exacerbating the conflicts in Sudan. But none of these supposed causal chains stay linked under close scrutiny--the conflicts over resources are usually symptomatic of deeper failures in governance and other primal forces for conflicts, such as ethnic tensions, income inequalities and other unsettled grievances. Climate is just one of many factors that contribute to tension. The same is true for scenarios of climate refugees, where the moniker "climate" conveniently obscures the deeper causal forces. The dangers of disease have caused particular alarm in the advanced industrialized world, partly because microbial threats are good fodder for the imagination. But none of these scenarios hold up because the scope of all climate-sensitive diseases is mainly determined by the prevalence of institutions to prevent and contain them rather than the raw climatic factors that determine where a disease might theoretically exist. For example, the threat industry has flagged the idea that a growing fraction of the United States will be malarial with the higher temperatures and increased moisture that are likely to come with global climate change. Yet much of the American South is already climatically inviting for malaria, and malaria was a serious problem as far north as Chicago until treatment and eradication programs started in the 19th century licked the disease. Today, malaria is rare in the industrialized world, regardless of climate, and whether it spreads again will hinge on whether governments stay vigilant, not so much on patterns in climate. If Western countries really cared about the spread of tropical diseases and the stresses they put on already fragile societies in the developing world, they would redouble their efforts to tame the diseases directly (as some are now doing) rather than imagining that efforts to lessen global warming will do the job. Eradication usually depends mainly on strong and responsive governments, not the bugs and their physical climate. Rethinking Policy IF RESOURCE wars are actually rare--and when they do exist, they are part of a complex of causal factors--then much of the conventional wisdom about resource policies needs fresh scrutiny. A full-blown new strategy is beyond this modest essay, but here in the United States, at least three lines of new thinking are needed.First, the United States needs to think differently about the demands that countries with exploding growth are making on the world's resources. It must keep their rise in perspective, as their need for resources is still, on a per capita basis, much smaller than typical Western appetites. And what matters most is that the United States must focus on how to accommodate these countries' peaceful rise and their inevitable need for resources. Applied to China, this means getting the Chinese government to view efficient markets as the best way to obtain resources--not only because such an approach leads to correct pricing (which encourages energy efficiency as resources become more dear), but also because it transforms all essential resources into commodities, which makes their particular physical location less important than the overall functioning of the commodity market. All that will, in turn, make resource wars even less likely because it will create common interests among all the countries with the greatest demand for resources. It will transform the resource problem from a zero-sum struggle to the common task of managing markets. Most policymakers agree with such general statements, but the actual practice of U.S. policy has largely undercut this goal. Saber-rattling about CNOOC'S attempt to buy Unocal--along with similar fear-mongering around foreign control of ports and new rules that seem designed to trigger reviews by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States when foreigners try to buy American-owned assets--sends the signal that going out will also be the American approach, rather than letting markets function freely. Likewise, one of the most important actions in the oil market is to engage China and other emerging countries fully in the International Energy Agency-which is the world's only institution for managing the oil commodity markets in times of crisis--yet despite wide bipartisan consensus on that goal, nearly nothing is ever done to execute such a policy. Getting China to source commodities through markets rather than mercantilism will be relatively easy because Chinese policymakers, as well as the leadership of state enterprises that invest in natural resource projects, already increasingly think that way. The sweep of history points against classic resource wars. Whereas colonialism created long, oppressive and often war-prone supply chains for resources such as oil and rubber, most resources today are fungible commodities. That means it is almost always cheaper and more reliable to buy them in markets. At the same time, much higher expectations must be placed on China to tame the pernicious effects of its recent efforts to secure special access to natural resources. Sudan, Chad and Zimbabwe are three particularly acute examples where Chinese (and in Sudan's case, Indian) government investments, sheltered under a foreign-policy umbrella, have caused harm by rewarding abusive governments. That list will grow the more insecure China feels about its ability to source vital energy and mineral supplies. Some of what is needed is patience because these troubles will abate as China itself realizes that going out is an expensive strategy that buys little in security. Chinese state oil companies are generally well-run organizations; as they are forced to pay the real costs of capital and to compete in the marketplace, they won't engage in these strategies. The best analog is Brazil's experience, where its state-controlled oil company has become ever smarter--and more market oriented--as the Brazilian government has forced it to operate at arm's length without special favors. That has not only allowed Petrobras to perform better, but it has also made Brazil's energy markets function better and with higher security.Beyond patience, the West can help by focusing the spotlight on dangerous practices--clearly branding them the problem. There's some evidence that the shaming already underway is having an effect--evident, for example, in China's recent decision to no longer use its veto in the UN Security Council to shield Sudan's government. At the same time, the West can work with its own companies to make payments to governments (and officials) much more transparent and to close havens for money siphoned from governments. Despite many initiatives in this area, such as the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative and the now-stalled attempt by some oil companies to "Publish What You Pay", little has been accomplished. Actual support for such policies by the most influential governments is strikingly rare. America is notably quiet on this front. With regard to the flow of resources to terrorists--who in turn cause conflicts and are often seen as a circuitous route to resource wars--policymakers must realize that this channel for oil money is good for speeches but perhaps the least important reason to stem the outflow of money for buying imported hydrocarbons. Much more consequential is that the U.S. call on world oil resources is not sustainable because a host of factors--such as nationalization of oil resources and insecurity in many oil-producing regions--make it hard for supply to keep pace with demand. This yields tight and jittery markets and still-higher prices. These problems will just get worse unless the United States and other big consumers temper their demand. The goal should not be "independence" from international markets but a sustainable path of consumption. When the left-leaning wings in American politics and the industry-centered National Petroleum Council both issue this same warning about energy supplies--as they have over the last year--then there is an urgent need for the United States to change course. Yet Congress and the administration have done little to alter the fundamental policy incentives for efficiency. At this writing, the House and Senate are attempting to reconcile two versions of energy bills, neither of which, strikingly, will cause much fundamental change to the situation.Cutting the flow of revenues to resource-rich governments and societies can be a good policy goal, but success will require American policymakers to pursue strategies that they will find politically toxic at home. One is to get serious about taxation. The only durable way to rigorously cut the flow of resources is to keep prices high (and thus encourage efficiency as well as changes in behavior that reduce dependence on oil) while channeling the revenues into the U.S. government treasury rather than overseas. In short, that means a tax on imported oil and a complementary tax on all fuels sold in the United States so that a fuel import tax doesn't simply hand a windfall to domestic producers. And if the United States (and other resource consumers) made a serious effort to contain financial windfalls to natural-resources exporters, it would need--at the same time--to confront a more politically poisonous task: propping up regimes or easing the transition to new systems of governance in places where vacuums are worse than incumbents.Given all the practical troubles for the midwives of regime change, serious policy in this area would need to deal with many voids.Finally, serious thinking about climate change must recognize that the "hard" security threats that are supposedly lurking are mostly a ruse. They are good for the threat industry--which needs danger for survival--and they are good for the greens who find it easier to build a coalition for policy when hawks are supportive.

### 2nc no extinction

**carter**

#### Worst case it takes 100 years

**Page 11**-Article Cites Study Conducted by the US National Science Foundation, Quotes Anreas Schmitner, Professor @ the College of Earth, Ocean, and Atmospheric Sciences [Lewis, The Register, Free Whitepaper-IBM System Networking RackSwitch G8264, “Global Warming Much Less Serious than Thought-New Science,” 11/25/2011, <http://www.theregister.co.uk/2011/11/25/runaway_warming_unlikely/>]

Climate scientists funded by the US government have announced new research in which they have established that the various doomsday global warming scenarios are in fact extremely unlikely to occur, and that the scenarios considered likeliest - and used for planning by the world's governments - are overly pessimistic. The new study improves upon previous results by including data from the remote past, rather than only examining records from recent times. "Many previous climate sensitivity studies have looked at the past only from 1850 through today, and not fully integrated paleoclimate data, especially on a global scale," says Andreas Schmittner, professor at the College of Earth, Ocean, and Atmospheric Sciences at Oregon State uni. "When you reconstruct sea and land surface temperatures from the peak of the last Ice Age 21,000 years ago – which is referred to as the Last Glacial Maximum – and compare it with climate model simulations of that period, you get a much different picture. "If these paleoclimatic constraints apply to the future, as predicted by our model, the results imply less probability of extreme climatic change than previously thought," Schmittner adds. The baseline assumption of climate science at the moment is that given a doubling of atmospheric CO2 compared to pre-industrial levels the most probable result is that the Earth would see a surface temperature rise average of 3°C - and that there would be a significant chance of much bigger, perhaps fatal rises. Schmittner and his colleagues' analysis says that the planet's climate simply can't be this sensitive to CO2 changes, however, or much more extreme events should have occurred at certain points in the past - and they did not. For instance, if the climate were sensitive enough that doubled CO2 could mean catastrophic warming, the low carbon levels seen 21,000 years ago should have resulted in an equally lifeless iceball planet. "Clearly, that didn't happen," Schmittner says. "Though the Earth then was covered by much more ice and snow than it is today, the ice sheets didn't extend beyond latitudes of about 40 degrees, and the tropics and subtropics were largely ice-free – except at high altitudes. These high-sensitivity models overestimate cooling." According to the new improved analysis, the most probable result as and when double CO2 occurs is actually a rise of just 2.3°C - only just above the 2°C limit which international climate efforts are seeking to stay within. Plainly there's no great need to fear a rise above 450 parts per million (ppm) CO2, as people currently do - in fact there's no likely prospect of getting near a 2°C temperature rise for a century or more at present rates of CO2 increase (rising about about 2 ppm/year at the moment from a level of 390-odd). And Schmittner and his colleagues' results show a much tighter grouping of possible futures, too, so the scope for way-out doomsday scenarios is hugely reduced. The Australian [quotes](http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/health-science/climate-forecasts-exaggerated-science-journal/story-e6frg8y6-1226205464958) Schmittner as saying: "Now these very large changes (predicted for the coming decades) can be ruled out, and we have some room to breathe and time to figure out solutions to the problem." The new study [is published](http://www.sciencemag.org/content/early/2011/11/22/science.1203513.abstract?sid=d47377ad-6df7-4f10-a1d7-ac371826abcf) in top-ranking boffinry journal Science. The research was funded by the US National Science Foundation. ®

## cp

### 2nc avoids ptx

#### causes blame shifting

**Bryner, ’87** [Gary, Ph. D in Govt, Poli Sci @ BYU, “Bureaucratic Discretion: Law and Policy in Federal Regulatory Agencies,” p.5-6]

Bureaucratic discretion is also defended as a practical response to the inability of traditionally separated governmental powers to deal effectively with the policy challenges confronting them. James Landis defended the broad grants of discretionary authority to administrative agencies not as "simply an extension of executive power" but a "full audit of authority nec­essary for |them| in order to plan, to promote, and to police," thus represent­ing "an assemblage of rights normally exercisable by government as a whole." "The administrative process." he argued, is an "answer to the inadequacy of the judicial and the legislative processes.'"\* Discretion is especially important in regulatory agencies, as it permits administrative officials to be flexible and adaptable in tailoring their efforts to specific situations. Laws cannot be written to anticipate and address all of the possible situations within an agency's jurisdiction. They must permit a consideration of economic, regional, cultural, personal and other differences among those who fall within (he agency's regulatory reach. Discretion per­mits the regulators to tailor their efforts to particular circumstances and con­cerns, produce regulatory actions that arc reasonable and fair, and effectively accomplish policy objectives.” Discretion Is a fundamental clement of modern administrative theory and is consistent with important norms of pluralism and democracy. It is also consistent with political incentives and serves as an attractive way for legisla­tors to delegate responsibility for difficult decisions to bureaucrats. Credit can be claimed for legislative action, blame can be deflected when specific efforts clash with politically powerful interests, and constituents can be culti­vated by intervening in unpopular agency actions.

#### c) avoids spending debates

**Schoenbrod ‘99**, David *(*Trustee Professor of Law, New York Law School) “DELEGATION AND DEMOCRACY: A REPLY TO MY CRITICS” *CARDOZO LAW REVIEW* [Vol. 20:731 1999] http://www.constitution.org/ad\_state/schoenbrod.htm

Unlike Mashaw, members of Congress understand that delegation lets them avoid responsibility. That is why they go to great lengths to use delegation to avoid blame not only for regulation, but also for raising their own salaries.[[69]](http://www.constitution.org/ad_state/schoenbrod.htm#069) If, as Mashaw argues, legislators do not truly avoid blame through delegation, they would not be so reluctant to invoke the Congressional Review Act to try to repeal agency laws with which they disagree. In an attempt to show that ending delegation would be of no benefit, Mashaw points out that spending bills are full of detail, yet “perhaps nowhere in American politics do legislators make better use of selective information and creative incoherence than in explaining to the American people what has been done in constructing the federal budget.”[[70]](http://www.constitution.org/ad_state/schoenbrod.htm#070) Mashaw is right about the legislative appropriations process, but he is wrong to think that legislative lawmaking would work the same way.[[71]](http://www.constitution.org/ad_state/schoenbrod.htm#071) There is an accountability loophole in the Constitution for appropriations, but not lawmaking. The Constitution’s provisions on appropriations were drafted with the expectation that Congress would not run planned budget deficits except to deal with emergencies.[[72]](http://www.constitution.org/ad_state/schoenbrod.htm#072) So long as Congress acted according to that expectation, it could not benefit one interest group without hurting some other group by reducing an appropriation or imposing a tax. Thus, interest would tend to thwart interest, as James Madison predicted.[[73]](http://www.constitution.org/ad_state/schoenbrod.htm#073) When that balanced budget expectation collapsed, more than a century later, Congress could give to Paul without seeming to take from Peter, because the cost of the appropriation is flung forward in time to be borne by persons yet to be identified. In contrast, with lawmaking, a law that benefits Paul will restrict Peter now, and Peter generally will have notice of this law and know whom to blame. Congress takes further advantage of the loophole in accountability for appropriations by lumping thousands of spending items together and voting on them wholesale. There is an implicit agreement in the Senate by which most members do not support amendments that strike items of spending, even those with support in their own states. The reason for the deal is that if such items were individually subject to vote, each senator would lose the ability to deliver pork to his constituents. What holds these thieves’ agreement together is that no senator has a Peter for a constituent who is complaining loudly that a particular item of spending hurts him. But Peter is there when Congress imposes rules of conduct. Unlike the appropriations’ agreements, an agreement to prevent the rule-by-rule consideration of proposed laws would collapse under its own weight. In sum, just because the Constitution has a loophole that permits legislators to hide the ball on spending is no excuse to let them violate the Constitution by hiding the ball on lawmaking.

#### d) solves link turns because Obama can take credit for positive outcomes of the plan

**Krent 94,** Harold(dean and professor of law – cites Schoenbrod, Trustee Professor of Law) “BOOK REVIEW: DELEGATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS: POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY.” - Columbia Law Review94 Colum. L. Rev. 710 , March 1994

Through delegation Congress shirks responsibility for some of the most fundamental political questions affecting our society - for example, how to balance the risk of toxic agents in the workplace against jobs, n16 or how to compare the gravity of drug offenses to espionage activities. n17 Congress has failed to agree upon which military bases to close, n18 and which organizations merit broadcast licenses. n19 Yet members of Congress can claim credit for attempting to solve the problems of the environment and the economy by authorizing agencies to tackle the problems, and then distance themselves from the ensuing regulation if unfavorable to their constituents. Delegation permits legislators to "look good" to their constituents without necessarily providing tangible benefits (pp. 8687). n20 Congress may too readily distribute rights without imposing [\*715] commensurate obligations, concealing the tradeoffs that must necessarily follow (p. 9).

### at theory

#### . Education – delegation versus congressional implementation is a core question of policy – certain agents are more able to solve particular policies than others. It’s impossible to determine whether the plan is valuable without looking to the branch of government implementing it

**Komesar, 94** (Neil, professor of law at the University of Wisconsin, Imperfect Alternatives: Choosing Institutions in Law, Economics, and Public Policy, p. 4-5)

My belief in the importance of institutional choice and comparative institutional analysis is not universally shared, however. There are, in fact, dramatic anomalies in the study of law and public policy when it comes to the subject of deciding who decides. For example, one would assume that the central issue of constitutional law is the choice of who decides—the choice between alternative social decision-makers such as the executive, the legislative, and the judiciary—and that, therefore, constitutional scholarship would be replete with sophisticated analyses of these alternatives. In turn, one would assume that, when economic analysts of law—usually non-constitutional law—consider the issue of who decides, these high priests of trade-offs and opportunity costs would know that one cannot decide who decides by examining only one alternative. Yet most constitutional scholars ignore the issue of who decides or at most treat it with superficial maxims. And when economic analysts of law address the subject of who decides, they often focus their attention on the attributes of only one alternative. Constitutional law and the economic approach to law are important enough aspects of legal study that such anomalies standing alone would justify searching inquiry. But, in fact, these anomalies are only dramatic examples of a pervasive problem in the analysis of law and, more generally, of public policy. Although important and controversial decisions about who decides are buried in every law and public policy issue, they often go unexamined, are treated superficially, or, at best, are analyzed in terms of the characteristics of one alternative. Most existing theories of law and public policy focus attention on social goals and values. The economic approach to legal analysis is cast in terms of a single social goal—resource allocation efficiency. Its critics attack that goal as insufficient both normatively and descriptively, while its proponents defend its validity. Constitutional law analysis is largely a debate about social goals and values such as resource allocation efficiency, Rawlsian justice, or Lockean protection of property. Although the choice among social goals or values is an important ingredient in understanding and evaluating law and public policy outcomes, analysis of goal and value choices, standing alone, tells us virtually nothing about these outcomes—what they are or what they should be. Upon close inspection, each social goal bandied about in analyses of law and public policy is generally consistent with virtually any law or public policy outcome. In other words, a given goal can be seen as consistent with liability or no liability, regulation or no regulation, constitutional right no constitutional right. Goal Choice may be necessary to the determination of law and public policy, but its is far from sufficient. A link is missing—an assumption overlooked—in analyses that suppose that a given law or public policy analysis that ostensibly depends solely on goal choice is the judgment, often unarticulated, that the goal in question is best varied out by a particular institution. Given the goal of protecting property, for example, the case for recognizing a constitutional right involves the implicit judgment that the adjudicative process protects property better than the political process. In turn, given the goal of promoting safety, the case for removing tort liability involves the implicit judgment that the market or government regulation promote safety better than the adjudicative process. **Goal choice and institutional choice are both essential for law and public policy. They are inextricably related.** On the one hand, institutional performance and, therefore, institutional choice can not be assessed except against the bench mark of some social goal or set of goals. On the other, because in the abstract any goal can be consistent with a wide range of public policies, the decision as to who decides determines how a goal shapes public policy. It is institutional choice that connects goals with their legal or public policy results. **Institutional choice is difficult as well as essential.** The choice is always a choice among highly imperfect alternatives. The strengths and weaknesses of one institution versus another vary from one set of circumstances to another. For example, whether the adjudicative process is the best protector of property rights or the worst determiner of safety is by no means obvious. Sometimes the courts will be the best protectors of private property, and sometimes that task will be better assigned to the political process. Sometimes the courts will be the best determiners of safety, and sometimes the courts will be the best determiners of safety, and sometimes that task will be better assigned to the political process or the market

# 1nr

### 2nc impact overview

#### **DA outweighs and turns the case --- global economic collapse causes nuclear war and extinction in the short term, which means only the DA turns the case --- creates global hotspots and diversionary war which emboldens rogue nations --- that’s Friedberg and Schoenfeld. Obviously a larger internal link than terror --- consumer confidence is empirically denied debt ceiling is critical to the economy**

#### Turns every aff impact.

Harris and Burrows 9

Mathew, PhD European History @ Cambridge, counselor in the National Intelligence Council (NIC) and Jennifer is a member of the NIC’s Long Range Analysis Unit “Revisiting the Future: Geopolitical Effects of the Financial Crisis” <http://www.ciaonet.org/journals/twq/v32i2/f_0016178_13952.pdf>

Increased Potential for Global Conflict

Of course, the report encompasses more than economics and indeed believes the future is likely to be the result of a number of intersecting and interlocking forces. With so many possible permutations of outcomes, each with ample Revisiting the Future opportunity for unintended consequences, there is a growing sense of insecurity. Even so, history may be more instructive than ever. While we continue to believe that the Great Depression is not likely to be repeated, the lessons to be drawn from that period include the harmful effects on fledgling democracies and multiethnic societies (think Central Europe in 1920s and 1930s) and on the sustainability of multilateral institutions (think League of Nations in the same period). There is no reason to think that this would not be true in the twenty-first as much as in the twentieth century. For that reason, the ways in which the potential for greater conflict could grow would seem to be even more apt in a constantly volatile economic environment as they would be if change would be steadier. In surveying those risks, the report stressed the likelihood that terrorism and nonproliferation will remain priorities even as resource issues move up on the international agenda. Terrorism’s appeal will decline if economic growth continues in the Middle East and youth unemployment is reduced. For those terrorist groups that remain active in 2025, however, the diffusion of technologies and scientific knowledge will place some of the world’s most dangerous capabilities within their reach. Terrorist groups in 2025 will likely be a combination of descendants of long established groups\_inheriting organizational structures, command and control processes, and training procedures necessary to conduct sophisticated attacks\_and newly emergent collections of the angry and disenfranchised that become self-radicalized, particularly in the absence of economic outlets that would become narrower in an economic downturn. The most dangerous casualty of any economically-induced drawdown of U.S. military presence would almost certainly be the Middle East. Although Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons is not inevitable, worries about a nuclear-armed Iran could lead states in the region to develop new security arrangements with external powers, acquire additional weapons, and consider pursuing their own nuclear ambitions. It is not clear that the type of stable deterrent relationship that existed between the great powers for most of the Cold War would emerge naturally in the Middle East with a nuclear Iran. Episodes of low intensity conflict and terrorism taking place under a nuclear umbrella could lead to an unintended escalation and broader conflict if clear red lines between those states involved are not well established. The close proximity of potential nuclear rivals combined with underdeveloped surveillance capabilities and mobile dual-capable Iranian missile systems also will produce inherent difficulties in achieving reliable indications and warning of an impending nuclear attack. The lack of strategic depth in neighboring states like Israel, short warning and missile flight times, and uncertainty of Iranian intentions may place more focus on preemption rather than defense, potentially leading to escalating crises.

#### **Turns warming and bio d--- collapse of the economy prevents the US’ ability to invest in green projects, also prevents the US from buying sugar ethanol**

#### **Turns Cuba collapse --- debt ceiling would crushes the US’ ability to maintain troops in hotspots around the world, means a withdrawal of troops triggers hotspots**

#### Debt ceiling causes Iran strikes

Nimmo 6

Kurt, Iran Attack: No Way Back Now, 1/18/6, http://www.uruknet.info/?p=m19768&l=i&size=1&hd=0

But none of this is relevant now. Israel will goad the United States—with the dumbfounded blessing of the Europeans (or their blue-blood rulers) and the ineffectual suck-up Security Council—into blasting the daylights out of Iran, probably killing thousands, if not eventually hundreds of thousands of innocent people. It appears all of this will go down in March, when "diplomacy" finally fails in the United Nations and, significantly, when America reaches its $8,184 trillion debt ceiling, thus forcing the nation (to the greedy glee of the criminal neolib financier class) into a spurt of military Keynesianism in order to jump-start the economy. Few seem to notice this is what happened in Germany in the 1930s and the result was fascism and mass misery and incomprehensible numbers of dead people. "Wars provide an economic boost but typically produce little of lasting value," notes [Gracchus Jones](http://www.waynemadsenreport.com/guest1.htm). "But in America today, there is no economic engine, and if there is one thing modern economic history proves, it is that you cannot have prosperity without one."

#### Nuclear war

Chossudovsky in 7

Michel, Professor of Economics, The Unthinkable: The US- Israeli Nuclear War on Iran, http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=viewArticle&code=CHO20070121&articleId=4536

The World is at the crossroads of the most serious crisis in modern history. The US has embarked on a military adventure, "a long war", which threatens the future of humanity. At no point since the first atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima on August 6th, 1945, has humanity been closer to the unthinkable, a nuclear holocaust which could potentially spread, in terms of radioactive fallout, over a large part of the Middle East. There is mounting evidence that the Bush Administration in liaison with Israel and NATO is planning the launching of a nuclear war against Iran, ironically, in retaliation for its nonexistent nuclear weapons program. The US-Israeli military operation is said to be in "an advanced state of readiness". If such a plan were to be launched, the war would escalate and eventually engulf the entire Middle-East Central Asian region. The war could extend beyond the region, as some analysts have suggested, ultimately leading us into a World War III scenario.

### 2ac uq

#### Debt ceiling will be resolved now --- Obama is devoting capital which overcomes opposition --- that’s Pace.

#### You should view uniqueness through the lens of political capital because Obama can sway additional votes before the deadline

#### Will pass, but it’ll be close

Kapur 9/17

Sahil, Talking Points Memo, No Endgame In Sight To Avert A Government Shutdown, 9/17/13, http://talkingpointsmemo.com/dc/no-endgame-in-sight-to-avert-a-government-shutdown

President Barack Obama is losing his patience. He scolded Republicans during a speech Monday for threatening a government shutdown -- or worse, a debt default -- to unwind the health care law, reminding them that they lost the 2012 election.¶ "I cannot remember a time when one faction of one party promises economic chaos if it can't get 100 percent of what it wants. That's never happened before. But that's what's happening right now," the president said. "The Affordable Care Act ... was an issue in last year's election and the candidate who called for repeal lost."¶ The White House has no intention of caving, for several reasons: there's no election looming; the falling deficit reduces the impetus for spending cuts; and Republicans will take the blame for a shutdown. Republicans don't want to cave because they're anxious to undermine Obamacare before its implementation accelerates on Oct. 1 and extract spending concessions after getting none in the fiscal cliff deal early this year.¶ "It's a shame that the president could not manage to rise above partisanship today," Boehner retorted on Monday afternoon. "Instead, he should be working in a bipartisan way to address America's spending problem -- the way presidents of both parties have done before. He should work with us to delay his health care law for everyone."¶ It's a particularly bad sign if even Boehner, who wants to avoid a shutdown, is fueling the sentiments of the anti-Obamacare crowd at this critical juncture. Even the deeply polarized Congress of recent years has managed to avert shutdown and default. But it remains to be seen whether, in the face of all the new obstacles, leaders can pull another rabbit out of their hats. The final days tend to focus their minds.

#### A) all sides want political cover but it’ll be a huge fight – plan upsets the balance

Birnbaum 9-10-13 – columnist for The Washington Times, a Fox News contributor and president of BGR Public Relations (Jeffrey, “The other approaching war; The debt-ceiling struggle is soon to envelop Capitol Hill, again,” Lexis)

Congressional insiders were surprised when the Treasury Department announced that the federal borrowing limit would be reached in mid-October. They had previously thought that they had at least until November, and probably until December, to air out their many arguments before finding a workable compromise.¶ That won't happen. The debate over budget levels and taxes will be jammed into September and early October, giving very little time to spare.¶ Some Republicans smell a rat. They suspect that Treasury Secretary Jacob Lew manipulated the numbers to move up the deadline and, in that way, force Republicans to take a hard position that might lead to a government shutdown or, worse, a default on government debt. There isn't any evidence of that.¶ What is happening, though, fits a common and often-misunderstood pattern in Washington. Both sides take extreme opening positions so that the final outcome, they hope, will be closer to where they want to be. If their initial bids are too reasonable, the negotiators end up giving up too much when crunch time comes. This creates the impression, now increasingly believed, that a solution can never be found because the opposing sides are so far apart.¶ Don't believe it. Yes, positioning is in full swing. For example, the White House asserts it will not negotiate anything that might be attached to a "clean" debt-ceiling bill. House Speaker John A. Boehner, in turn, recently told a fundraising crowd that he would demand at least a dollar-for-dollar cut in federal spending for every dollar increase in the federal borrowing limit that is passed. (This is a retreat from a softer position on that same topic earlier this summer.) Don't accept that view as immutable. These are opening bids in what will be a wild set of negotiations starting soon.

#### B) – business pressures

Cowan and Lowder 9/13

Richard and David, Reuters, Analysis: House Republicans go for broke in fiscal battles, 9/13/13, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/09/13/us-usa-congress-debt-ceiling-analysis-idUSBRE98C04620130913

There are risks for Democrats and Obama too. While polling results showed the public more upset with Republicans then Obama after the "fiscal cliff" fight that led to across-the-board budget cuts, Obama's Gallup approval rating started on a downward trend then from which it has yet to recover, with other polls suggesting that Americans hold all parties in Washington as well as the president responsible for "gridlock."¶ With the deadlines fast-approaching, the maneuvering is well underway.¶ The White House announced that Obama would speak to the Business Roundtable group of big-company chief executives next week. White House spokesman Jay Carney did not offer any details about what Obama will say, but he has used business groups in the past to pressure Congress to avoid fiscal brinkmanship.¶ "We will never accept anything that delays or defunds" Obamacare, Carney stressed again on Thursday.¶ In the U.S. Capitol, the top four Republican and Democratic leaders of the Senate and House met in the office of House of Representative Speaker John Boehner on Thursday to try to plot out a happy ending to their government spending and debt limit challenges. Afterward, Boehner told reporters "there are a million options that are being discussed by a lot of people."¶ But while Republicans control the House, Boehner does not control Republicans.¶ HIGH-STAKES MANEUVER¶ The intra-party fight on such a high-stakes maneuver as coupling Obamacare changes to the debt limit hike is seen as pushing negotiations on the legislation right up to the October or November deadline.

#### PC high now

Kornblum 9/11

John, Former U.S. ambassador to Germany, Judy Asks: Is Obama a Lame-Duck President?, 9/11/13, http://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/?fa=52932&lang=en

U.S. President Barack Obama is far from a lame-duck president.¶ Such charges often arise when a politician is facing difficulties, and it is true that Obama has not been as adroit as he might have been on issues such as Syria. But if Syrian stocks of poison gas are put under international control, as was proposed this week, he will in fact gain in both influence and reputation.¶ And the reality is that the U.S. economy is improving, the nation’s overseas military involvements are being cut back, and the Republicans continue to self-destruct.¶ There is rough sledding ahead, but the president has more than enough political capital to deal with the problems he faces.

#### Its also key to the agenda

Sargent 9/13

Greg, Washington, Post, The Morning Plum: Delusions and lies about Obamacare come back to haunt GOP leaders, 9/13/13, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/plum-line/wp/2013/09/13/the-morning-plum-delusions-and-lies-about-obamacare-come-back-to-haunt-gop-leaders/

The new NBC/WSJ poll contains bad news for Dems. But the poll is even worse news for the whole country, because it may make Republicans more likely to think they have the leverage they need to use this fall’s confrontations to somehow undermine Obamacare.¶ The key findings are that 44 percent of Americans say they oppose a debt ceiling increase, versus only 22 percent who favor one. In a reversal, Republicans are now more favored on the economy by by four points, and on the deficit by 13 points.¶ Of course, public opinion always tilts against the debt limit — that didn’t stop Republicans from caving on it earlier this year — and as the NBC write-up notes, Obama has the bully-pulpit, which ultimately flipped opinion on it last time. But for conservatives looking for ways to rally the shock troops for the coming confrontation, this poll could boost their case that the GOP must hold firm in its demand to block or delay Obamacare, probably in the debt ceiling fight, where GOP leaders say they will make their stand against the law. Some are already pointing to it as proof of leverage.¶ But the poll also finds that an astonishingly low 23 percent favor the GOP as the party that is looking out for the middle class. As the GOP pollster who helped conduct the poll put it: “The Republican Party is not on the playing field in terms of who’s being considered as representing the values of the middle class. That is fundamental positioning problem.” Indeed, it’s a terrible place to be, heading into a war in which Republicans will be armed with little more than an austerity message as justification for unleashing more economic havoc.

### at fiat solves link

#### 1. Even if you win this argument – there’s still backlash to the plan which drains Obama’s capital and triggers the link

#### 2. Fiat is the least means necessary – Obama changes his mind and pushes it, that’s the most likely. Your interpretation would have every senator/representative change their mind.

#### 3. Politics DAs are good – key to neg ground, net benefit to tons of counterplans, the only way to access current events education. Important because debaters become policymakers. Defer to link specificity – this is a no risk unwarranted arg by the aff.

### at intrinsicness

#### We should evaluate the politics DA as an intrinsic cost of the plan

#### a) Decisionmaking --- Willpower is a finite resource both in Congress and our personal lives --- debating the politics DA lets us practice being realistic about our ability to make and stick to tough choices.

#### Intrinsicness is a voting issue –

#### 1) Moving target - affs should have to defend the plan to the death

#### Politics DAs are good they force current events research on a topic that stays the same and we gain education about the political effects of the plan – which is key to prevent civic disengagement later in life.

### Link

#### Sugarcane cooperation costs PC

Piccone 13

Ted, Senior fellow and deputy director at Brookings, Time to Bet on Cuba, 3/18/13, http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2013/03/18-cuba-piccone

These new circumstances offer President Obama a rare opportunity to turn the page of history from an outdated Cold War approach to Cuba to a new era of constructive engagement. In his second term in office, he should place a big bet by investing political capital in defrosting relations, an approach that will advance U.S. interests in a stable, prosperous and democratic Cuba.¶ Under Castro, the Cuban government has undertaken important reforms to modernize and liberalize the economy. Cubans are now permitted to buy and sell property, open their own businesses, hire employees and enter into co-ops, with state-owned enterprises on a more equal footing. The updating of the Soviet-style economic system is a gradual and highly controlled process. But the recent legal emergence of formal, small-scale private businesses (cuentapropistas) that can now compete on a more equal footing with state-owned enterprises opens a window into a profound shift in thinking already under way on the island. The reforms also offer new opportunities for U.S. engagement.¶ Castro’s loosening of the apron strings extends beyond the economy. In January, the Cuban government lifted exit controls for most citizens, which is likely to accelerate the process of reconciliation within the Cuban diaspora. It could also result in a swift uptick of Cubans departing for the United States, demanding a reconsideration of U.S. migration policy to manage the increase. The gradual handoff of power to a next generation of more pragmatic party and military leaders who will determine the pace and scope of the reform process is yet further evidence that the Castro generation is looking forward to securing a viable legacy.¶ The U.S. approach to Cuba has likewise undergone important changes since Obama took office. Since the expansion of travel and remittances in 2009, hundreds of thousands of the 1.8 million Cuban Americans living in the United States have sent more than $2 billion to relatives there, providing important fuel to the burgeoning private sector and empowering citizens to be less dependent on the Cuban state.¶ Much more, however, could be done. In his second term, Obama has a wealth of policy options available to him through executive authority that would reframe U.S. support for the Cuban people and advance U.S. national interests.¶ In his second term, the president can (and should):¶ Appoint a special envoy to open a discrete dialogue with Havana without preconditions to discuss such issues as migration, travel, counterterrorism and counternarcotics, energy and the environment, and trade and investment. Such talks could result in provisions that strengthen border security, protect Florida from oil spills, break down the walls of communication that prevent our diplomats from traveling outside Havana and help U.S. businesses export more goods, and thereby create jobs.¶ Authorize financial and technical assistance to support burgeoning small businesses and permit trade in goods and services with certified independent entrepreneurs.¶ Expand the list of exports licensed for sale to Cuba, including school and art supplies, water and food preparation systems and telecommunications equipment.¶ Grant general licenses for journalists, researchers, humanitarian organizations and others to facilitate people-to-people exchanges.¶ Remove Cuba from the list of state sponsors of terrorism, where it does not belong, allowing a greater share of U.S.-sourced components and services in products that enter Cuban commerce.¶ This list is not exhaustive; the president can take any number of unilateral steps to improve relations and increase U.S. support to the Cuban people, as mandated by Congress. He can also expect significant pushback from a well-organized and vocal minority of elected officials who are increasingly out of step with their constituencies on this issue. (In the 2012 election, Obama’s share of the Cuban-American vote increased by 10 points in Miami-Dade county.) He can win the argument, however, by demonstrating that these measures are in the spirit of the congressional mandate to encourage a free and prosperous Cuba.

#### Liberalizing policy towards Cuba costs capital – Congress will upset other items on the agenda

LeoGrande 12

William, School of Public Affairs @ American University, Fresh Start for a Stale Policy: Can Obama Break the Stalemate in U.S.-Cuban Relations?, 2012, http://www.american.edu/clals/upload/LeoGrande-Fresh-Start.pdf

Where in the executive branch will control over Cuba policy lie? Political considerations¶ played a major role in Obama's Cuba policy during the first term, albeit not as preeminent a¶ consideration as they were during the Clinton years. In 2009, Obama's new foreign policy team¶ got off to a bad start when they promised Senator Menendez that they would consult him before¶ changing Cuba policy. That was the price he extracted for providing Senate Democrats with the¶ 60 votes needed to break a Republican filibuster on a must-pass omnibus appropriations bill to¶ keep the government operating. For the next four years, administration officials worked more¶ closely with Menendez, who opposed the sort of major redirection of policy Obama had¶ promised, than they did with senators like John Kerry (D-Mass.), chair of the Foreign Relations¶ Committee, whose views were more in line with the president's stated policy goals.¶ At the Department of State, Assistant Secretary Arturo Valenzuela favored initiatives to¶ improve relations with Cuba, but he was stymied by indifference or resistance elsewhere in the¶ bureaucracy. Secretary Hillary Clinton, having staked out a tough position Cuba during the¶ Democratic primary campaign, was not inclined to be the driver for a new policy. At the NSC,¶ Senior Director for the Western Hemisphere Dan Restrepo, who advised Obama on Latin¶ America policy during the 2008 campaign, did his best to avoid the Cuba issue because it was so¶ fraught with political danger. ¶ When the president finally approved the resumption of people-to-people travel to Cuba,¶ which Valenzuela had been pushing, the White House political team delayed the announcement¶ for several months at the behest of Debbie Wasserman Schultz. Any easing of the travel¶ regulations, she warned, would hurt Democrats' prospects in the upcoming mid-term elections.43¶ The White House shelved the new regulations until January 2011, and then announced them late¶ Friday before a holiday weekend. Then, just a year later, the administration surrendered to¶ Senator Rubio's demand that it limit the licensing of travel providers in exchange for him¶ dropping his hold on the appointment of Valenzuela's replacement.44¶ With Obama in his final term and Vice-President Joe Biden unlikely to seek the¶ Democratic nomination in 2016 (unlike the situation Clinton and Gore faced in their second¶ term), politics will presumably play a less central role in deciding Cuba policy over the next four¶ years. There will still be the temptation, however, to sacrifice Cuba policy to mollify¶ congressional conservatives, both Democrat and Republican, who are willing to hold other¶ Obama initiatives hostage to extract concessions on Cuba. And since Obama has given in to such¶ hostage-taking previously, the hostage-takers have a strong incentive to try the same tactic again.¶ The only way to break this cycle would be for the president to stand up to them and refuse to give¶ in, as he did when they attempted to rollback his 2009 relaxation of restrictions on CubanAmerican travel and remittances.¶ Much will depend on who makes up Obama's new foreign policy team, especially at the¶ Department of State. John Kerry has been a strong advocate of a more open policy toward Cuba,¶ and worked behind the scenes with the State Department and USAID to clean up the "democracy¶ promotion" program targeting Cuba, as a way to win the release of Alan Gross. A new secretary¶ is likely to bring new assistant secretaries, providing an opportunity to revitalize the Bureau of¶ Western Hemisphere Affairs, which has been thoroughly cowed by congressional hardliners. But¶ even with new players in place, does Cuba rise to the level of importance that would justify a¶ major new initiative and the bruising battle with conservatives on the Hill? Major policy changes¶ that require a significant expenditure of political capital rarely happen unless the urgency of the¶ problem forces policymakers to take action.

### A2: Winners Win

#### Plan is not a win – unpopular legislation forces the president to become over-invested which inhibits winning

#### Not fast enough – vote soon – has to be a lose before it’s a win

#### Winners-win theory is wrong --- Obama’s first term proves

**Calmes 11/13** (Jackie, International Herald Tribune, “Obama looks to budget talks as an opportunity to take control of agenda; News Analysis,” 11/13/2012, Factiva, CMR)

Whether Mr. Obama succeeds will reveal much about what kind of president he intends to be in his second term. Beyond the specifics of any accord, perhaps the bigger question hanging over the negotiations is whether Mr. Obama will go to his second inaugural in January with an achievement that starts to rewrite the unflattering leadership narrative that, fairly or not, came to define his first term for many people.¶ That story line, stoked by Republicans but shared by some Democrats, holds that Mr. Obama is too passive and deferential to Congress, a legislative naïf who does little to nurture personal relationships with potential allies — in short, not a particularly strong leader. Even as voters re-elected Mr. Obama, those who said in surveys afterward that strong leadership was the most important quality for a president overwhelmingly chose Mr. Romney.¶ George C. Edwards III, a **leading scholar of the presidency** at Texas A&M University who is currently teaching at Oxford University, dismissed such criticisms as shallow and generally wrong. Yet Mr. Edwards, whose book on Mr. Obama’s presidency is titled ‘‘Overreach,’’ said, ‘‘He didn’t understand the limits of what he could do.’’¶‘‘They thought they could continuously create opportunities and they would succeed, and then there would be more success and more success, and we’d build this advancing-tide theory of legislation,’’ Mr. Edwards said. ‘‘And that was **very naïve, very silly**. Well, they’ve learned a lot, I think.’’¶ ‘‘Effective leaders,’’ he added, **‘‘exploit opportunities rather than create them.’’**

#### Hirsh concedes political capital matters

Hirsh 2/7

Michael, chief correspondent, There’s No Such Thing as Political Capital, 2/7/13, http://www.nationaljournal.com/magazine/there-s-no-such-thing-as-political-capital-20130207

The point is not that “political capital” is a meaningless term. Often it is a synonym for “mandate” or “momentum” in the aftermath of a decisive election—and just about every politician ever elected has tried to claim more of a mandate than he actually has. Certainly, Obama can say that because he was elected and Romney wasn’t, he has a better claim on the country’s mood and direction. Many pundits still defend political capital as a useful metaphor at least. “It’s an unquantifiable but meaningful concept,” says Norman Ornstein of the American Enterprise Institute. “You can’t really look at a president and say he’s got 37 ounces of political capital. But the fact is, it’s a concept that matters, if you have popularity and some momentum on your side.”

### at: summers

#### Obama won’t nominate Summers – knows it would cost PC

Mctague 9/14

Jim, Barron’s, Politics and the Race for the Fed, 9/14/13, http://online.barrons.com/article/SB50001424052748704287804579039000271945322.html?mod=BOL\_twm\_col#articleTabs\_article%3D1

President Obama's loss of face last week for his ham-fisted management of the Syrian crisis is bad news for his friend Larry Summers, who's a candidate for the chairmanship of the Federal Reserve. Obama, desperate to polish his badly tarnished image, can't risk a public spanking from Congress on the heels of the Syrian fiasco. Summers probably would engender this sort of rebuke—and much of it from Obama's own party.

### at: guns

#### Financial issues over gun control

Roberts 9/17

Dan, The Guardian, Washington navy yard doctor calls gun violence the 'evil in our society', 9/17/13, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/17/washington-navy-yard-shooting-gun-control

The Newtown Action Alliance will hold a fresh rally in Washington on Thursday, but a separate event planned for Tuesday, to coincide with a scheduled committee hearing debating Florida's controversial "stand your ground" legislation, was postponed because of the navy yard attack.¶ It is unclear whether the White House is willing to expend any more of its dwindling political capital in backing fresh legislative attempts, having been rebuffed in the Senate in April. President Obama lamented "yet another mass shooting" during initial comments on Monday, but then continued with a planned event to discuss the five-year anniversary of the financial crisis.

### 2nc at syria

#### 1nc Pace evidence says Syria is on hold – Obama is pushing resolution of the debt ceiling – prefer issue specific uniqueness – Obama has enough PC to hold on the debt ceiling

#### Russia deal provides cover – no loss of PC

Bohan 9/11

Caren, Reuters, Delay in Syria vote frees Obama to shift to hefty domestic agenda, 9/11/13, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/09/11/us-usa-obama-agenda-idUSBRE98A0Z920130911

Putting off a decision on military strikes on Syria allows President Barack Obama to shift his attention back to a weighty domestic agenda for the fall that includes budget fights, immigration and selecting a new chairman of the Federal Reserve.¶ Obama and his aides have immersed themselves for a week and a half in an intensive effort to win support in Congress for U.S. military action in Syria after a suspected chemical weapons attack last month killed more than 1,400 people.¶ But the effort, which included meetings by Obama on Capitol Hill on Tuesday followed by his televised speech to Americans, seemed headed for an embarrassing defeat, with large numbers of both Democrats and Republicans expressing opposition.¶ The push for a vote on Syria - which has now been delayed - had threatened to crowd out the busy legislative agenda for the final three months of 2013 and drain Obama's political clout, making it harder for him to press his priorities.¶ But analysts said a proposal floated by Russia, which the Obama administration is now exploring, to place Syria's weapons under international control may allow Obama to emerge from a difficult dilemma with minimal political damage.¶ "He dodges a tough political situation this way," said John Pitney, professor of politics at Claremont McKenna College in California.¶ Pitney said the delay in the Syria vote removes a big burden for Obama, given that Americans, who overwhelmingly opposed military intervention in Syria, will now be able to shift their attention to other matters.

### Economy Impacts

#### Collapses the economy – no austerity measures

Pianin 9/10

Eric, Fiscal Times, Debt-Ceiling Danger Zone Threatens U.S., 9/10/13, http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/Articles/2013/09/10/Debt-Ceiling-Danger-Zone-Threatens-US

Take a deep breath: The latest doomsday scenarios for what might happen if Congress fails to raise the debt ceiling later this fall are now out. Sometime between Oct.18 and Nov. 15, the Treasury will exhaust its borrowing authority and begin running short of cash to pay the government’s bills in a timely fashion, according to a new analysis by the Bipartisan Policy Center released Tuesday.¶ Over the next 20 days or so, the Treasury would only have enough cash on hand to cover about two-thirds of government obligations. As it’s done during previous debt-ceiling crises, the Treasury began taking unusual steps and maneuvers to avoid default while buying the administration and Congress additional time to work out a compromise.¶ With no more “extraordinary measures” or budgetary gimmicks left to forestall a first-ever default, Treasury officials would likely have to choose between two alternatives – both of which would risk touching off a financial crisis and a downgrading of the government’s gold-plated credit rating.¶ One scenario would be to pay some bills but not others. That could mean paying out $222 billion in interest on Treasury securities, Medicare and Medicaid expenditures, Social Security checks, education programs, food stamps and defense contracts – while withholding $106 billion of income tax refunds, veterans’ benefits, Department of Health and Human Services grants and operating expenditures for a raft of federal departments and agencies.¶ The other options would be to hold off payments until there is enough cash to cover all obligations due on any given day. That would mean having to postpone payments for days or even weeks on everything except interest on the debt.¶ In a 2012 Office of Inspector General Report, some senior Treasury officials said they believed this second option would be the most plausible and least harmful course of action. Yet it would almost certainly prompt legal action by government creditors and vendors and rattle the global markets.¶ Back in the summer of 2011, Standard & Poor’s downgraded the government’s Triple-A rating after Congress and the Obama administration did not agree on a debt reduction plan and remained deadlocked until the very last minute in forging a budget deal that raised the debt ceiling.¶ So far, those maneuvers have included delaying the reinvestment of assets in the Federal Employees’ Retirement System G-Fund, the Exchange Stabilization Fund and the civil service and postal retirement fund. As of Aug. 31, the Treasury still had about $108 billion of extraordinary measures at its disposal, according to the BPC analysis.¶ The Obama administration has repeatedly warned of economic chaos and a possible government shutdown unless Republican lawmakers agree to raise the debt ceiling again.¶ Once that threshold is crossed, the government could default on payments to major creditors, begin shuttering federal agencies, furloughing workers or miss making Social Security payments to retirees. Obama has repeatedly said there will be no political bargaining over the debt ceiling, as there was two years ago. However, the top four Democratic and Republican leaders will meet privately on Thursday to discuss the debt ceiling and how to avoid a government shutdown before Oct 1, according to Politico.¶ The meeting, requested by Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid (D-NV), will be the first time the group has met since they departed Washington for the August recess. It will include House Speaker John Boehner (R-OH), House Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi (D-CA) and Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-KY).¶ Boehner said recently he’s gearing up for “a whale of a fight” with Obama over raising the debt ceiling, and that he’ll demand major concessions in terms of spending cuts and entitlement reforms in return for increasing the government’s nearly $16.7 trillion of borrowing authority. It would take an additional $1.1 trillion of borrowing authority to get the government through 2014, according to BPC’s analysis.¶ Treasury Secretary Jacob J. Lew warned Boehner in an August letter that unless Congress raised the debt ceiling, the government would lose the ability to pay all of its bills in mid-October.¶ “Congress should act as soon as possible to protect America’s good credit by extending normal borrowing authority well before any risk of default becomes imminent,” Lew wrote. “Based on our latest estimates, extraordinary measures are projected to be exhausted in the middle of October. At that point, the United States will have reached the limit of its borrowing authority, and Treasury would be left to fund the government with only the cash we have on hand any given day.”